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This report assesses the literature on the inter-relations between the economy and security 
with particular focus on terrorism and the “human drivers of insecurity” to identify both 
available knowledge and crucial research gaps. In addition, the report surveys the European 
research capacity in the field of security economics. The study is based on a thorough litera-
ture survey of the newly emerging field of security economics, using a variety of electronic 
catalogues and search engines as sources. 
The study reveals that it is not just terror attacks but also security measures of private and 
public agents responding to the threat of terrorism that incur significant repercussions for the 
economy, often with trans-national consequences. Impacts vary with the maturity of an econ-
omy; appropriate ex ante and ex post policies are critical to contain the damage of terrorism. 
Given the dynamic nature of human-induced insecurity, policies should place emphasis on 
“systemic resilience”.  
Gaps in the economic security literature include insufficient knowledge of the behaviour of 
terrorists and their targets. Furthermore, the global impacts of terror attacks and especially of 
security measures require more analysis. Future research requires a more rigorous conceptual 
framework, methodological improvements and, above all, better data. 
In comparison to the United States, the current research capacity in security economics in 
Europe is weak. On the one hand, there is significant research potential in the field of security 
economics within the European Union in the shape of several high quality researchers. On the 
other hand, the existing research infrastructure and institutional barriers both inhibit this po-
tential from being developed academically and for policy advice. Establishing a European 
network of security economists and funding a European centre for security economics could 
contribute to remedy this situation. 
 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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1 EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY 
1.1  Motivation and aims of the study  
One important feature of what is widely called the “new terrorism” (Maurer 2007) is its 
objective of harming the twin processes of economic growth in developed countries and of 
globalization in general; global terrorism therefore has an important economic dimension. 
While the economic repercussions of terrorist attacks, especially the repercussions of 9/11, 
have been very visible, what is less obvious and thus less entrenched in public awareness are 
the economic consequences of security measures and counter-terrorism policies. The Euro-
pean Union is committed to create and safeguard a European area of freedom and security 
while at the same time building an area of prosperity and economic growth. Yet, the analyti-
cal and empirical interplay between security and economic prosperity are still insufficiently 
understood in academic and policy circles.  
In order to provide an overview of research gaps and future research needs, this survey aims 
to map the “state of play of research” on the inter-relations between the economy and 
security with particular focus on terrorism and to identify the level of knowledge on the 
interaction between the cost distribution of both terrorism and anti-terrorism measures. 
To this end, the survey analyses the existing knowledge on the macro-economic impacts and 
the current understanding of underlying processes at the micro-economic level. Apart from 
considering aggregate indicators such as fiscal and trade impacts, investment, growth and 
productivity, the survey assesses the existing research on the impacts of insecurity on behav-
ioural patterns of consumers, households, the private sector (in general, as well as specific 
sectors) and policy makers, that ultimately determine impacts at aggregate macro-economic 
level.  
In addition, the report identifies institutes and research centres working on the economics 
of security with particular emphasis on the interplay between economy, terrorism and 
anti-terrorism measures and considers whether a critical mass exists to launch a pan-
European network of such centres and institutes. This helps to assess the present capacity 
of the European Union (EU) to fill knowledge gaps and advance research in security 
economies. In this respect the report assesses the number and capacity of EU security 
economists, the available research infrastructure and the prevailing institutional set-up to 
foster the development of the newly emerging discipline of security economics.  1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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1.2  Key findings of the survey  
The economic impacts of terrorism derive from three inter-related effects 1) direct and indi-
rect economic impacts caused by acts of terrorism 2) the direct and indirect economic im-
pacts resulting from security measures taken by private and public agents and 3) the dynam-
ics hat security measures trigger in the patterns of acts of terrorism. 
1.2.1  Direct and indirect economic impacts of terrorist attacks  
Accounting for the economic impacts of acts of terrorism involves two factors: on the one 
hand, costs arise from physical destruction, the loss of human life and health, and with re-
spect to the latter the longer term costs resulting from the treatment of chronic injuries and 
potential psychological traumas. On the other hand, terrorist attacks incur indirect im-
pacts resulting from the disruption of economic processes and activities, which may not 
be confined to the terrorised economy itself but may spill over to other activities, sec-
tors and economies. 
The relative size of the direct costs of terrorism which households, firms and the public 
sector have to bear is determined by the nature and the target of terrorism, i.e. it varies 
across events. Yet, irrespective of the nature and type of attack, economists argue that costs 
are likely to be underestimated as non-monetary impacts, such as repercussions on psycho-
logical wellbeing and life satisfaction, are not accounted for. These impacts may be eco-
nomically significant due to their potential repercussions on labour productivity.  
For the private sector substantial costs arise to those sectors directly hit by terrorist attacks. 
In the past only a few selected sectors have been regular targets of terrorist attacks and have 
received substantial attention in the literature, such as the transport and tourism sector but 
also the insurance sector. Governments will face direct costs resulting from the destruction 
of public infrastructure but will also incur costs to provide rescue and emergency operations. 
In the history of terrorism, 9/11 incurred unprecedented costs to firms and the US govern-
ment estimated to lie between US$ 25-60 billion. In contrast to this outlier, “conventional” 
attacks will incur much more limited costs.  
Apart from direct economic costs, terrorist attacks incur indirect impacts through the disrup-
tion of economic processes, which given the inter-connectivity of the global economy can 
incur significant repercussions. More generally, terrorism can impact on companies through 
increasing their overall level of market risk, credit risk, operational risk and business volume 
risk.  1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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Terrorism can trigger immediate reactions by economic agents (households, firms, govern-
ments) which can aggravate or even extent the economic losses. Stock market reactions to 
terrorism provide an example. Protracted terrorist activity - such as in Israel or Spain have 
shown to significantly impact on stock market values. In contrast, even though 9/11 pro-
duced an initially significant shock in global stock markets these were mitigated. This was 
ensured on the one hand, by an increased resilience of the diversified financial system to 
absorb shocks. Thus, globalisation has on the one hand enhanced the resilience of econo-
mies to large scale shocks while on the other increased the vulnerability of economies 
and economic agents to be affected by the repercussions of initially local events such as 
a terrorist attack. On the other hand, stock market impacts were mitigated by the swift 
policy reactions of the Federal Reserve and European Central Bank. Thus, appropriate 
policy decisions are critical to contain worst economic impacts of terrorism not only by 
helping economic agents to resume their activities but especially by restoring confidence 
into the economy.  
At the aggregate, macro-economic level, the economic repercussions of terrorism on growth 
have shown to be transient in large, well diversified economies, which can easily absorb 
shocks. Despite its scale, 9/11 did not have a permanent impact on the US economy. In con-
trast, terrorism can derive significant long term negative impacts on small, less devel-
oped economies, especially when terrorist events recur frequently. 
In summary, the economic impacts of acts of terrorism are determined by the nature, scale 
and frequency of terror activities; the immediate response reactions of economic agents 
which contribute to mitigate or aggravate attacks; and the maturity of the economic system 
and thus its ability to absorb shocks and contain spill-over effects. Given the uncertainty 
about the nature and scale of future terrorist events, more attention should be paid by 
researchers and policy makers to the significance of “systemic resilience” to buffer 
terror attacks. 
1.2.2  Economic effects of anti-terrorism policy  
Security measures taken by economic agents to protect themselves against terrorism, miti-
gate its impacts, or minimise the risk of terrorism altogether, include investments in security 
technologies and emergency relief, and adaptation of consumption and investment behaviour 
according to risk perceptions. Economic impacts therefore have to account for the direct 
investment expenditure into security technologies, their opportunity costs, externalities and 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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spill over effects as well as the impacts that changes in consumption and investment patterns 
incur on the economy. Overall, little disaggregate analyses of security measures taken by 
households, private and public agents exist. Yet, the growth in demand for security tech-
nologies (see Section 5.1.2) shows that economic agents do invest in security.  
Corresponding to the substantial losses incurred by sectors directly struck by terrorism, these 
sectors also face the greatest costs due to security expenditures and changes in demand for 
their goods and services. For example, the introduction of tightened security regulations 
incurred additional security spending of approximately US$ 43 billion for airlines, while 
airport operators are expected to spend an additional US$ 56 million annually on security 
measures after 9/11. In addition, the aviation industry experienced a loss in demand amount-
ing to US$ 15 billion in 2001. The literature quantifies similarly devastating losses due to 
changes in demand for the tourism industry. In contrast, the growth of demand that the secu-
rity industry records shows that security investments can have positive, not only negative, 
impacts. There is little systematic and comparable information on the security measures 
taken across countries at the government level, apart from indications of defence and home-
land security budgets. Since 9/11 a diversified set of security measures has been employed 
by the US and European countries, including protection of potential targets, proactive steps 
to fight terrorism and the mitigation of impacts (e.g. regulations in the insurance industry). 
However, the literature recognises a proclivity towards over-investing in protective meas-
ures at the expense of pro-active measures. 
These measures not only impact on governments’ budgets but can have implications for the 
economy at large. Especially in the case of low- and middle-income countries security and 
defence spending to fight terrorism may not only increase budget deficits but crowd out 
economically and socially significant investment thus jeopardising economic development. 
The literature does not find indications that increased spending on security will negatively 
impact on growth in large economies, though no conclusions are available for low to middle 
income economies. Apart from these fiscal impacts, increases in the level of security are 
hypothesised to stifle economic efficiency. Tightened security regulations at transport hubs 
increase transaction costs of trade with possible negative repercussions on trading times and 
thus costs, but also trade volumes. Yet, these conclusions are based on back of the envelope 
estimations generated shortly after 9/11 and so far no updated empirical research appears to 
be available.  1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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Beyond aggregate impacts at national level, security measures can have trans-national reper-
cussions particular where economic activities entail more than two countries, such as trade 
or foreign investment but also development aid. Transnational impacts may become even 
more significant where pro-active security measures of terror target countries are aimed at 
states who host terrorists.  
In summary, it is not only terrorist attacks themselves but the threat of terrorism which 
incurs impacts on the economy in the form of security measures that economic agents 
across all levels take. The economic repercussion of security measures are determined pri-
marily by the type of measures which are adopted, by the level of economic development, 
the size of the domestic security industry, which derives benefits from investments in secu-
rity spending. Although empirical evidence is scant the literature suggests that these 
security measures can have significant economic repercussions at both macro- and 
micro-economic level. Given political and economic inter-dependencies, economic re-
percussions of both terrorism and security measures can stretch beyond national 
economies. 
1.2.3  Dynamics between security and insecurity  
A full account of economic impacts of security measures should incorporate the impacts 
these measures have on terrorist behaviour. While security measures aim to decrease im-
pacts or the threat altogether, the literature shows that outcomes may differ markedly from 
the original aim. Although empirical evidence is hardly available, some “stylised facts” of 
strategic terrorist behaviour can be derived. According to these stylised facts, terrorists un-
dermine defensive policies, by changing their targets which could include a shift to a whole 
new geographic area, their forms of attack or the timing of their attack. With respect to de-
fensive measures, that aim to decrease resource endowments of terror organisations, terror-
ists will change the structure and management of their organisations to circumvent restric-
tions on their activities. In practice, the literature argues that terrorism in response to 
security measures has become more severe; shifted to relatively more permissive loca-
tions (such as the Middle East and Asia); and has decentralised its organisational 
structures to evade proactive policies as illustrated for example by the elusive network 
structure of al-Qaeda. 
These stylised facts build on the assumption that terrorists behave like rational economic 
agents, which implies that they hold a well defined set of preferences, and will select their 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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preferred choice of action to maximise utility within a given resource constraint. Terrorists 
face the choice to allocate their resource endowments between terrorist and non-terrorist 
activities; a change in the relative price of one will result in a shift towards the relatively 
cheaper other activity, be it a different form of terrorist, or non-terrorist action. The “price” 
can be equated with the economic costs that terrorists have to incur to execute an attack or 
the benefits derived from an attack. Both, costs or benefits, change with the level of security, 
the first in a positive, the latter in a negative relation. Although this model has proven useful, 
its explanatory power is restricted due to simplified assumptions about the nature and char-
acteristics of individual terrorists and terror organisations as a whole: first, it does not differ-
entiate between differing motivations and preferences of individual terrorists that will de-
termine how willing individuals are to give up their violent activities; second, the model 
does not account for factors that will determine the “price” or “value” of terrorist actions 
besides security measures themselves.  
The analysis of the dynamic interactions of terrorists and governments is constrained due to 
the lack of representative data indicating terrorist activity and security policy measures. 
Measuring the responses to security measures based on the number and characteristics of 
terror attack may provide some information but cannot track changes in the underlying terror 
activity. Thus, unless better indicators for terror and anti-terror activities are found, models 
on the response reactions of terrorist organisations to security measures cannot be tested 
empirically. 
1.3  Research needs and recommendations 
1.3.1  Gaps in the literature  
The review of the existing literature and knowledge uncovers six critical research gaps:  
1.  The available empirical literature focuses largely on the macro-economic outcomes 
rather than understanding the underlying processes that lead to these impacts. Particularly 
little is known about the structure and behaviour of terror organisations, with the conse-
quence that only limited conclusions can be drawn about the impacts and effectiveness of 
security measures to reduce terrorism. 
2.  The security economics literature focuses on the negative impacts caused by perpetrators 
but rather neglects impacts resulting from responses to terrorism. As the literature survey 
shows, economic impacts of terrorist events are transient in large economies but can be 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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extended due to security reactions of targeted agents. Yet, no detailed research is avail-
able that studies the actual responses of economic agents to terrorism. Related to this, no 
aggregate analysis exists that studies the macro-economic consequences of security 
measures on economies.  
3.  Further, the literature is heavily biased to impacts of terrorism in industrialised countries, 
even though it is shown that a) most terrorism is occurring in relatively less developed 
countries, b) economic development in less developed economies can be negatively af-
fected by both terrorism and security measures and c) there may be a relation between 
economic grievances and terrorist activities in terror host countries. Thus understanding 
the dynamics of terror in small economies may prove critical for the understanding of in-
security in the EU.  
4.  Terrorism and counter-terrorist measures are often analysed in isolation in the literature, 
although this form of insecurity represents only one element in a larger “portfolio of 
risks” which includes other factors of insecurity such as organised crime and conflicts. 
Further, there are several indications of substantial conceptual and practical overlaps be-
tween diverse threats to security which should be analysed within an integrated frame-
work of the “human drivers of insecurity”.  
5.  Much knowledge is based on theoretical reasoning with only limited and highly frag-
mented empirical evidence to substantiate the theory. The major cause of this gap is the 
restricted availability of data not only of terrorist behaviour but also of the behaviour of 
targets and their governments. 
6.  Last but not least, up to today only little of the academic research has been turned into 
readily available policy knowledge.  
1.3.2  Recommended future research  
Building on these knowledge gaps, the report suggests the following areas for future re-
search: 
1.  Structure and behaviour of terror organisations. This research area should provide a 
more nuanced insight into terrorists’ preferences and motivations, the emergence, evolu-
tion and cessation of terror organisations and their inter-relation with actors of security 
and insecurity not least to be able to understand the effectiveness of security measures to 
thwart terrorism. This should also include an analysis of the symbiosis of terror organisa-
tions and fragile states. 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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2.  Structure and behaviour of targeted agents: This area of enquiry should provide a 
more coherent overview of the type of security measures taken by different economic 
agents, the reason for their choices and the consequences these have at micro-economic 
level.  
3.  The economic impacts of terrorism. Even though this area has been researched in 
relative more detail, the analysis should be extended to cover a wider range of countries, 
especially developing countries. Further, while knowledge exists on the impacts of terror 
attacks on the economy no information is available on the economic repercussions of un-
derlying terror activities especially in host countries.  
4.  The economic impacts of security measures. This area of research should focus par-
ticularly on the quantification of dynamic costs but also benefits derived from security 
measures. Cost calculations should place specific emphasis on less visible impacts such 
as increased frictional costs, decreased efficiency and trans-boundary impacts. In other 
words the dynamic inter-play between security and growth.  
5.  Conceptual ground work is requires to overcome the isolated analysis of terrorism and 
place it into a larger framework of security and insecurity. 
6.  Data collection and methodologies. More representative data of terror activity and the 
application of methodologies able to account for the various non-monetary impacts of ter-
rorism are critical to provide a more accurate quantification of impacts and repercussions 
of terrorism and security measures. 
7.  Policy relevant knowledge. Apart from general accounts of security measures, a critical 
analysis of current EU policy should identify their coherence across member states, their 
effectiveness and their potential negative repercussions.  
1.4  EU research capacity  
The analysis of the research capacity in the discipline of security economics in the European 
Union and beyond shows that there is substantial research potential embodied in a number 
of high quality academics interested in the economic analysis of security and terrorism. Yet, 
the current research infrastructure and institutional set up in the European Union 
create significant barriers to maximise the potential and capacity of security econom-
ics. In fact, there does not yet exist a critical mass of European security economists to ensure 
the viability of this new discipline, especially vis-à-vis the much larger capacity of the 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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United States. The barriers are less manifest in the quality of the researchers involved in this 
emerging field but they relate to the existing research infrastructure and institutional barri-
ers. These barriers also questions the success of combining sound economic and security 
policy making with a view to achieve “secure growth” in Europe. 
The creation of a research network would allow security economists to communicate and 
cooperate and to enhance the visibility of economics and economists in security policy mak-
ing. Such network could contribute towards establishing a minimum critical mass of Euro-
pean research capacity in the field of security economics. Further steps would be the estab-
lishment of a European centre for security economics and more national support for research 
on security economics. 
 2 INTRODUCTION 
  1
 
The economics of security is one of the most important issues in our discipline, yet, the one 
least researched  
(Martin Feldstein, Former President of the American Economic Association, speaking at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, Chicago, 5 January 2007)  
 
Economic theory in particular can offer key insights, enabling governments to optimise their 




The study aims to survey the existing knowledge on the economics of security in the litera-
ture and to identify gaps in knowledge and expertise. Further, it assesses the European re-
search capacity, its strengths and weaknesses in this field, and, as far as possible, produces a 
complete list of research centres and institutes on the economics of security within the Euro-
pean Union (EU) and of major ones outside of Europe.  
One important feature of what is widely called the “new terrorism” (Maurer 2007) is its 
objective of harming the twin processes of economic growth in developed countries and of 
globalization in general. Terrorism therefore has an important economic dimension, for 
example, by reducing bilateral trade flows and annual direct foreign investment inflows, by 
causing a negative relative performance of stocks and by damaging the tourist industry, thus, 
causing a huge loss of income in the affected country. Yet, the fight against terrorism also 
has strong economic consequences, for example by affecting the ease of travel or trade, by 
targeting insurance regulations or by dampening consumers’ and firms’ expectations. 
The European Union is committed to create and safeguard a European area of freedom, 
security and justice. At the same time, the European Union is building an area of prosperity 
and economic growth. It is obvious that these two aspects are closely inter-linked: security 
influences prosperity and vice versa (European Commission 2006: 1). The need to protect 
liberal societies against terrorism must therefore be balanced against the need to protect 
market economies from too much regulation in the name of security. On the one hand, it is 
argued that trade-offs between security and economic freedom have to be made in the fight 
against terrorism. On the other hand, it may be possible to develop a synthesis whereby 2 INTRODUCTION 
  2
market economies remain secure and prosperous. In effect, the “security economy” may 
have to learn from the “green economy” to reconcile security and growth (Brück, 2004). 
The European Commission has made important advances in recognizing the potential con-
tribution of economics in the analysis of security. The European Security Research Advisory 
Board states that “economic theory in particular can offer key insights, enabling govern-
ments to optimise their efforts to enhance security and growth” (ESRAB 2006:59). Building 
on this insight, the Seventh Framework Programme for Research and Technological Devel-
opment (FP7) recognizes not only the role of security as research programme but dedicates 
funds explicitly to the area “security economics”.  
However, the European Union is not yet sufficiently prepared to intellectually meet this 
challenge. Its capacity for economic analysis and policy making in this field is still weak, 
especially in comparison with the United States. This is a result from several factors: first, 
the large geographical dispersion of economic research capacity on terrorism and anti-terror 
policy plays a role; second, experts are spread across many different sub-disciplines in eco-
nomics, which often do not communicate with each other. Third, many authors publishing 
books and articles in the field of economics of security usually work on other themes and 
simply lend their expertise to the analysis of terror-related economic phenomena on a tem-
porary basis, thus making experts on economics of security a very transient phenomenon. 
Still the economic literature on terrorism has made remarkable inroads (Frey 2004; Brück 
2006; Enders and Sandler 2006) building on already available research, which had previ-
ously not received much attention. Nevertheless, despite of remarkable progress, different 
areas of research remain insufficiently integrated and various aspects still need to be studied 
in depth (Llussa and Tavares 2006). 
This report provides an in-depth analysis of existing research and assesses the possibility to 
create a network of experts on the economic analysis of terrorism and counter-terrorist 
measures. 
2.1  Expected benefits at the European level 
The survey will derive following benefits at the European level:  
First, the study brings together knowledge and makes expertise available to academic re-
searchers and policy-makers in Europe. Hence, it will help “to make collective policy re-
sponses to the terrorist threat” which are seen as crucial in the European Union Counter-2 INTRODUCTION 
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Terrorism Strategy (Council of the European Union 2005: 4). It will contribute to develop 
European scientific knowledge and to strengthen the European research capacity on security 
and insecurity thus helping to break the quasi research monopoly of the United States. 
Second, the study will provide the groundwork to build a future research agenda, which 
could be coordinated through the planned European Forum for Security Research and Inno-
vation (ESRIF). To this end, it identifies critical questions and issues which require further 
research. In this respect, the integration of economics into security research and of new 
security issues into economic research creates an important balance to the technologically 
oriented approaches to fight terrorism. Even if new technologies can help fight terrorism, 
their effectiveness is also determined by their social, political and economic characteristics 
and circumstances. This study therefore attempts to give a first assessment of anti-terror 
policy interventions from an economic perspective. 
Third, fighting terrorism requires a profound understanding of the underlying patterns and 
dynamics of terror behaviour. Economic approaches can not only contribute to model and 
therefore comprehend the symptoms of terrorist activity but can also provide insights into 
underlying motives and root causes of terrorism.  
Lastly, recognising that the present economic vulnerabilities to terrorism are not only caused 
by the threat itself, but also by the characteristics of the global economy, this study provides 
a first entry to the discussion of the trade-offs between “sustainable systemic security” ver-
sus economic efficiency and competitiveness. This survey aims to provide an overview of 
the available knowledge which is necessary to initiate a debate on the trade-offs between 
security and the economy. Ultimately, this study is a stepping stone for a larger project to 
identify opportunities and obstacles to Europe’s objective to “become the most competitive 
(…) economy in the world by 2010”, as stated in the Lisbon Strategy. 
2.2  Scope and tasks of the survey  
According to the guidelines laid out in the terms of reference, this survey presents and 
comments on the existing research and knowledge on the inter-relation between economy 
and security – with a particular focus on terrorism - in a comprehensive manner. It incorpo-
rates an analysis of the level of knowledge about the causal chains between security respec-
tively insecurity and economy to show how the former translate themselves into the latter. 
Relevant knowledge on the interaction between the costs distribution of both terrorism and 
anti-terrorism measures are identified as well. With reference to the above mentioned tasks, 2 INTRODUCTION 
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the survey gives special emphasis to the direct and indirect economic consequences of ter-
rorism and anti-terrorism measures for the European economy. 
Furthermore, the survey assesses the European research capacity in the field of economics of 
security and identifies possible weaknesses. It points out fields of research that yet need to 
be studied thoroughly in order to aggregate the existing knowledge and propose ways of 
enhancing research in these fields in the future. Moreover, the study shows where relevant 
expertise outside of the European Union lies. This is meant to help scholars and policy mak-
ers to draw on useful sources beyond the geographical scope of the European Union, too. 
Last but not least, the survey identifies research centres and institutes within the 27 member 
states of the European Union which specialize on the economics of security focussing on the 
interplay between economy, terrorism and anti-terrorism measures, or similar fields of re-
search. The survey analyzes to what extent a critical mass of such institutions and expertise 
exists and will propose ways of linking European experts on the economics of security, thus 
helping to connect and aggregate relevant knowledge and expertise across the European 
Union.  
Since the survey concentrates on the impacts and dynamic effects of terrorism in the short- 
to long-run it will not provide a detailed analysis of the literature on the origins and causes 
of terrorism as such. It will consider drivers and determinants of terrorism in so far as it is 
important to provide insights into the dynamics between security measures and terrorist 
events in the long run. Further, as this survey focuses on perspectives and methodologies 
from the discipline of economics, it largely excludes non-economic literature on terrorism. 
However, it should be noted that this non-economic literature is not only extensive but 
should be seen as complementary to the economics literature not least as it covers some 
issues and aspects which have so far been overlooked by economists. In other words, eco-
nomics contributes to the study of terrorism with important tools, yet it is not sufficient to 
understand all the complexities of the security-insecurity nexus. 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
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3 RESEARCH  METHODOLOGY 
3.1  Definitions and concepts  
The terror attacks that destroyed the World Trade Centre in New York September 11th, 
2001 (hereafter 9/11) and subsequent attacks in Europe have introduced a new dimension of 
terrorism. 9/11 and subsequent terror attacks have challenged existing notions on the “eth-
ics” of terrorist organisations and created a new atmosphere of uncertainty: as the unimagin-
able happened, the large scale terrorist events since 2001 have turned a low probability 
event, into an event with a higher likelihood, but also into an event whose likelihood cannot 
be estimated. In other words, what was previously rejected as significantly unlikely has now 
become not only possible but also probable. Yet, given lack of data it is difficult to predict 
the actual level of probability. Consequently, although previous historic incidences such as 
nuclear accidents had enhanced the awareness of living in a “risk society” 9/11 has further 
influenced conceptions of risk, insecurity and vice versa security. 
3.1.1  Risk and insecurity  
Brück (2006) defines insecurity as “aggregate, unquantifiable form of risk”, risk as the prob-
ability of a harmful event to happen (where the level of risk rises with an indicator being 
close to its threshold) and consequently, security as the absence of this risk, i.e. a zero prob-
ability of a harmful event to happen (Brück 2006). A conceptually similar portrayal is pro-
vided by Czinkota (in Suder 2004) who differentiates between risk and uncertainty. Risk is a 
known entity to the extent that its probability can be estimated, e.g. based on certain vari-
ables which have been derived historically or through research; yet, uncertainty implies the 
impossibility to quantify the probability of an event to happen. In sharp contrast to for ex-
ample natural disasters that are somewhat predictable, terrorists or more generally “human 
drivers of insecurity” deliberately seek to evade attempts for prediction thus reproducing 
uncertainty or creating an environment of “dynamic insecurity”.  
Terrorism is not the only source of insecurity, but only one among many others, such as 
organised crime, political instability or economic shocks, natural disasters or industrial acci-
dents. Consequently, the risk of terrorism is defined not only by its own absolute probability 
but also by the likelihood of other events to happen. Given that the “portfolio of risks” and 
their likelihoods vary across time, across countries and across stakeholders, the importance 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
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that is assigned to a particular element of insecurity, e.g. terrorism and its salience on the 
policy agenda will vary as well. Moreover, the notion of risk is not objectively defined but 
strongly influenced by individual’s perceptions and risk aversion which is often based on 
cognitive experiences of the past rather than estimations of probability of future events. 
Consequently, security policy at the level of the European Union has to consider that na-
tional security priorities will vary across member states given that each member state has to 
manage its specific set of insecurities and risks. 
3.1.2 Security 
The phenomenon of “dynamic insecurity” has important repercussions on notions of “secu-
rity” and security provision. As Auerswald, Branscomb et al. (2005) suggest the goals of 
security provision, need to be redefined shifting from the objective to protect potential tar-
gets against all possible risk factors, towards the notion to enhance systemic resilience 
through building capabilities to minimise impacts in case of attack. It might be more sus-
tainable to decrease vulnerabilities and increase the resilience of (economic) systems over-
all, rather than trying to fight a single cause of insecurity in isolated fashion.  
This concept of security provision is based on the understanding that insecurity and vulner-
ability are two sides of the same coin. In other words, the level of both risk and uncertainty 
is determined not just by the threat per se but by the degree of systemic vulnerability. Kun-
reuther (2006) building for example on Beck’s Risk Society (1992) identifies the current 
state of inter-dependencies in the economic context as a critical factor of vulnerability. 
These interdependencies imply that a local event can have global repercussions and as a 
result, a system of interdependent elements and actors is only as secure as its weakest link 
(ibid). Every actor will decide independently whether to invest in security or not; neverthe-
less, these individual decisions can have severe repercussions on overall system security. As 
the effectiveness of individual security investments is partly dependent on security invest-
ments of other agents, the decision to invest in security will depend on the expected actions 
of other agents. Consequently, without appropriate mechanisms to overcome possible coor-
dination failures this situation can lead to sub-optimal levels of security when actors – un-
certain of the investment behaviour of others – decide not to invest in security (Kunreuther 
and Heal 2003).  
A second disincentive to security provision is the partly public good nature of security; some 
investments into certain types of security will provide benefits to society at large, not just 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
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the entity investing in these actions. In contrast, other measures of security retain a private 
good element, which allow the investor to reap all returns from the investment. In the case 
of trans-national terrorism, the public-private good dichotomy is most significant at the 
international level: protective policies aimed at securing a particular country, for example 
against al-Qaeda attacks, will benefit only this respective country and the people within its 
territory; proactive policies that target the actual terror threat in contrast incorporates posi-
tive externalities to other potential target countries who benefit from the reduced capacity of 
the terror organisation without action themselves. This free rider problem is -according to 
Enders and Sandler (2006) - a likely explanation why international actors are more inclined 
to rely on defensive rather than proactive policies when addressing transnational terrorism, 
even though as game theoretic models show, coordinated action could theoretically bestow 
higher benefits to all countries (ibid). 
3.1.3 Terrorism 
In this survey, terrorism will be defined as “the premeditated use or threat of use of extra-
normal violence or brutality by sub-national groups to obtain a political, religious, or ideo-
logical objective through intimidation of a huge audience, usually not directly involved with 
the policymaking that the terrorists seek to influence” (Enders and Sandler, 2002:145). This 
definition has also been used by security economists in Europe such as Tavares (2004) and 
Brück (2006). Nevertheless, this definition has its shortcomings: first, it does not reflect the 
varieties of terrorism that have occurred in history and across countries (Hoffman 1998). 
Such aggregate definition runs the danger of masking the heterogeneity of terrorism and 
terrorists, their behaviour and consequently the impact. At the most basic, it is necessary to 
differentiate between large versus small scale attacks; continued versus protracted inci-
dences; domestic versus trans-national terrorism.1 This differentiation between different 
types of terrorism is critical as economic impacts of terrorism and the complexity of coun-
termeasures vary with the nature of the terror attack. Regarding the latter, trans-national 
terrorism involves the cooperation between at least two countries to tackle the causes and 
consequences of terrorism, and requires taking into account host and target country factors 
and their interactions that may drive terrorist activity.  
Second, the above definition does not account for the political characteristics of the term 
terrorism: ultimately “every sovereign state reserves to itself the political and legal authority 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
  8
to define terrorism in the context of domestic and foreign affairs” (Alexander and Alexan-
der, 2002: 1). As history shows, terrorists have become “freedom fighters” when power 
shifted hands. For the purpose of security economics this can have important repercussions 
for the reliability of data. Especially when data collection is based on government statistics 
acts might be defined as terrorist or other acts according to political suitability rather than 
“objective” criteria. In the context of the EU, the Council Framework Decision on combat-
ing terrorism of 13 June 2002 states that “the definition of terrorist offences should be ap-
proximated in all Member States, including those offences relating to terrorist groups” 
(Council Framework Decision (2002/475/JHA) §6) as suggested by the same document 
(Article 1 and 2).  
3.1.4  Security economics  
Security economics is understood as those activities affected by, preventing, dealing with 
and mitigating insecurity, including terrorism, in the economy. Such a broad definition in-
cludes private and public activities in both legal and illegal areas of the economy. Narrower 
versions of this definition (such as a focus on state spending for homeland security or private 
spending for anti-crime devices) may be adopted by other authors for different purposes 
(Brück, 2004: 376). Security economics further refers to the application of economic tools to 
analyse the origins and dynamics of (in-) security. 
3.2 Data  sources 
3.2.1  Information collection activities  
The survey is based on extensive and thorough research of the literature to evaluate the cur-
rent level of understanding on the inter-relation between security and the economy. Building 
on the important recent works of Brück, Enders & Sandler, Frey and Tavares, knowledge 
gained to-date has been assessed and gaps in the literature identified. To this end, an exten-
sive list of references has been compiled using Google Scholar, Repec, EconLit, SSCI and 
electronic catalogues of major libraries in Europe and the United States, including academic 
literature (both theoretical and empirical) as well as policy and business reports. 
                                                                          
1 Trans-national terrorism denotes an act of terrorism which involves actors and targets from at least two differ-
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3.2.2  Geographical scope of information gathering 
The literature which has been reviewed for the purposes of this survey has been compiled 
irrespective of its country of origins to provide a global overview of the current state of 
research.  
3.2.3  Key informants and stakeholders 
The study builds on the knowledge and expertise of the project directors, advisors and staff 
as key informants. The members of the cross-European research team are established experts 
in the field of the economics of security with emphasis both on economic effects of terror-
ism and of anti-terrorism measures. They also contribute their expertise in advising national 
and international policy makers on antiterrorism policy from an economic point of view and 
on research policy concerning the economics of security. The DIW Berlin as a lead institu-
tion stands for high quality of economic research. Given the high policy relevance of the 
subject and of the study, the senior experts contributed to this project academically at re-
duced rates or without fees, thus, making the study extremely cost effective.  
3.3  Research approach and methodological considerations 
3.3.1 Research  approach 
Economic theory and applied economic analysis can contribute to the analysis of terrorism 
and its economic impacts and of security policies and their wider repercussions. The survey 
assesses the degree of available information on ultimate economic impacts reflected in 
macro-economic variables and impacts on specific sectors. Furthermore, it assesses how 
potential and actual terrorist events determine consumer and producer behaviour, public 
policy as well as terrorist responses to these policies. Apart from the impacts on the respec-
tive economic levels, distributional effects are analysed including the distribution of impacts 
between segments within an economy and between economies within the international eco-
nomic system. Theoretical aspects, empirical and policy work have been considered and key 
themes but also key methods and available data used in these studies have been identified. 
This will help design future European research policy in this field as the availability of data 
(or the lack thereof) will be a key determinant of what type of research and policy advice 
can be advanced.  3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
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Apart from analysing the literature a list of research centres and institute within the 27 
member states of the European Union has been compiled which specialize on the economics 
of security or complementary research, focusing on the interplay between economy, terror-
ism and anti-terrorism measures. To assess EU research capacity, these institutions have 
been classified according to their main focus of research, their source of funding (private or 
public); their main activities (e.g. research, policy advice, teaching and networking). The 
main aim is to assess the degree to which these centres cover a) issues pertaining to security 
economics b) duplicate efforts or leaving gaps and c) whether there is sufficient creation of 
policy relevant information. To contextualise European research capacity, this list will be 
compared to a similar list containing major research centres in the US.  
Many studies exist which provide overviews and summarise the impacts of terrorism, yet, 
these do not differentiate between various (temporal) stages of terrorist events and their 
repercussions: a) direct short run impacts triggered by an attack itself, b) the medium to 
longer term responses induced by fear and resulting security responses of agents, which c) 
will trigger reactions by terrorists. Most existing studies attribute the dynamic repercussions 
of terrorism to the terrorist event itself, even though the much of the economic repercussions 
are determined by the reactions of targets rather than terrorist actions. This distinction is 
critical as it provides a perspective on relative dimensions of the economic repercussions of 
the actual attacks versus the economic repercussion of response reactions, which at least in 
theory could be reduced through adequate management of a post- and pre-terror situation. In 
an attempt to reflect these different impact categories, the report is divided into three sec-
tions:  
1.  The impacts of terrorist attacks account for the economic repercussions to the econ-
omy from a risky event (Brück 2006) both at macro- and micro-economic level. These 
impacts correspond to the aftermath of an event, and deal with the immediate reaction of 
victims to a terrorist attack.  
2.  The economic impacts of security measures – or “costs of terrorism”2 (ibid) - result 
from the responses of agents to re-establish an environment of security. Brück (2006) fur-
ther differentiates between 1st and 2nd order effects; the first corresponding to impacts on 
private security spending and the second to policy reactions. Within the context of time, 
these activities occur between terrorist events, i.e. they are activities which attempt to 
                                                                          
2 Note here the difference between the specific terrorist attack and the reactions arising from a general fear of 
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prevent an attack altogether, or target to minimise the impacts and thus costs from an ac-
tual attack. These impacts do not only arise from public security policies but are also a re-
sult of changes in behaviour at individual level, which lead to a changed allocation of re-
sources to consumption and production. Consequently, the ultimate impact of terrorism is 
not only determined by the nature of the terrorist attack but also by the reactions of the 
respective agents, leading to the hypothesis that impacts resulting from security reactions 
could outweigh the impacts of terrorist attacks themselves (Chen and Siems 2004; Brück 
2006).  
3.  The dynamic analysis of both terrorism attacks and security measures, which rec-
ognises that terrorists’ behaviour will respond to both previous terrorist events and to se-
curity measures of public and private agents. These adjustments in behaviour (for exam-
ple in the nature of attacks, or in the type of target) will in turn result in a changed aggre-
gate impact of terrorist attacks. In other words, security responses do not only contribute 
to the total costs of a past terrorist event but also partly determine the economic repercus-
sions of terrorism in the future. 
The differentiation between the direct and indirect economic effects of terrorism is not al-
ways straightforward not least since most of the available literature has so far aggregated 
rather than differentiated between the two. Consequently, in some cases, no unambiguous 
classification is possible.  
3.3.2  Other methodological considerations 
There are at least four methodological problems associated with the evaluation of costs and 
benefits of terrorist events and anti-terrorist measures: a) the problem of double counting; b) 
the problem to value non-monetary parameters; c) the insufficiency of data; and d) general 
limitations of economics as discipline.  
Ad a) Double counting refers to the problem of accounting for the same costs or benefits 
twice, and arriving at an inflated figure of economic impacts. In the case of terrorism, ag-
gregating the number of victims across different forms of terrorism (e.g. bombings, kidnap-
pings, hijackings, etc) could lead to double counting if an event incorporate two or more of 
these different forms of terrorism (e.g. hijacking of a plane and its subsequent bombing), and 
the victims of this single event are accounted for under each type of activity separately.  
Ad b) Non-monetary parameters refer to a value that has no market price equipment; a hu-
man life or life satisfaction for example have a value, which however is not readily quantifi-3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
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able. It might also include more tangible economic parameters which are simply not traded 
in the market and therefore do not have as such a monetary value. Consequently, accounting 
for their value is often difficult. This issue is well known in natural resource economics and 
has been addressed in the field of security economics by for example Frey & Lüchinger in 
various publications. They argue that the economic impacts of terrorism are likely to be 
underestimated as non-monetary losses do not appear in statistical databases and are there-
fore not accounted for. There are various methodologies such as contingent valuation3 or 
hedonic market pricing4 which aim to overcome these problems but their application is not 
without limitations.  
Ad c) As the understanding of terrorism and its impacts is based on reports on actual terror 
events in the media and by public statistics, the problem of “under-reporting” bias (the ten-
dency not to report a specific event and therefore underestimating the frequency of terror) 
can significantly influence the accuracy of security economics. Leading economists con-
clude that extant research has fallen short from addressing this issue in a systematic fashion 
yet, underreporting is indeed present, implying that the used databases for terrorism repre-
sent an understatement of the true number of terrorist incidents (Drakos & Gofas, 2006).  
Ad d) Even if economics can provide an additional dimension to evaluate policy choices, in 
many respects it cannot give clear cut answers to certain policy problems. Coughlin, Cohen 
et al. (2002) for example recognise that “economic theory does not provide a clear answer to 
what is likely to be a continuing source of controversy - the appropriate scope of govern-
mental involvement in security”. 
                                                                          
3 Contingent valuation has been applied by for example Viscusi & Zeckhauser (2003). 
4 The hedonic market approach is based on the idea that agents reveal their preferences regarding terrorism 
through for example. wage and salary demands and house / real estate prices. Yet, according to Frey and 
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4 ECONOMICS  OF  INSECURITY – ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF 
TERRORIST ATTACKS 
4.1  Existing studies and research  
Direct economic impacts of terrorism refer to the effects arising from the immediate after-
math of a terrorist event. Estimating these impacts requires accounting for the physical de-
struction of buildings and infrastructure and losses of human life or capabilities (through 
injury) but also for the economic impacts resulting from actions to mitigate impacts. Further, 
in an inter-dependent economic system, economic impacts arise from the disruption of eco-
nomic activities that terror attacks may cause, which imply that even economic entities 
which have not been direct targets of the attack are implicated by its effects. As this section 
will show, direct impacts of terror attacks vary depending on the nature and scale of the 
attack itself, the response reactions of economic agents but also on the maturity of the eco-
nomic system itself.  
4.1.1 Micro-economic  impacts 
Before assessing the aggregate impacts at the macro-economic level, micro-economic proc-
esses which determine the overall macro-economic effects need to be considered. At the 
most basic, it is possible to differentiate between three main types of economic actors, 
households or consumers, the private sector or producers and the public sector or govern-
ments. Depending on their involvement in the terrorist attack, they may suffer a) direct im-
pacts through terrorism through both physical and human losses and b) indirect impacts as 
consequence of the disruption of the economy. At the same time, they themselves may in-
fluence the economy through their immediate responses to the violent shock that occurred. 
Thus, apart from the actual costs, it is necessary to understand the underlying processes and 
behaviour which lead to these impacts, all based on the notion that appropriate management 
of a post-attack situation could potentially mitigate negative impacts.  
Direct economic losses of terrorism have reached new dimensions with the unprecedented 
magnitude of 9/11. Therefore it is not surprising that the core of the literature focuses on this 
event as a special case. The destruction that took place includes physical and human losses 
which far exceed the average scale of terrorist attacks: Human losses amounted to over 
3,000 lives lost (including office workers, aircraft passengers and hundreds of rescue per-4 ECONOMICS OF INSECURITY – ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS 
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sonnel), excluding the unaccounted number of people who suffered temporary and perma-
nent injury, who experienced health problems caused by the air pollution from the collapse 
of the buildings, not to mention the severe trauma and psychological impacts on victims and 
their families.  
Various studies have attempted to compute the actual costs resulting from these losses. Es-
timated figures differ depending on whether human losses have been incorporated into the 
calculation and due to various accounting problems, such as differences in definitions of 
damage, measurement of losses used, aggregation issues, but especially the difficulty to 
value a human life, etc. (Brück and Wickström 2004). Overall the estimations of human and 
capital costs of 9/11 range between US$ 25 – 60 billion. Navarro and Spence (2001) esti-
mate that human capital losses alone account for US$ 40 billion while property losses 
ranged “only” between US$ 10 and 13 billion. This accords to Baily’s estimate (Baily 
2001), yet is somewhat lower than the cost calculations of the OECD (Lenain, Bonturi et al. 
2002). Furthermore, rescue and clean-up operations have been estimated at US$ 11 billion 
(ibid). Of these aggregate costs, it has been estimated that 14 billion US accrued to the pri-
vate sector, 1.5 billion US for state and local government enterprises, 0,7 billion US for the 
US federal government (ibid).  
Yet, 9/11 is certainly an outlier with regards to the physical damage and human fatalities it 
caused in comparison to the majority of predominately nationalist separatist terrorist attacks 
that have been experienced in Europe. Apart from the scale two other key differences be-
tween 9/11 and “conventional” terror attacks prevail: first, recent trans-national terror at-
tacks have been larger scale but single events, while most terrorism in Europe has employed 
small scale attacks on a more frequent basis; second, 9/11 hit targets which stand not only 
symbolically but factually at the centre of global economic activity (not only the New 
York’s business and financial centre but also the aviation industry) thus subsequently caus-
ing major economic disruptions, which are not likely to ensue from the destruction of a more 
politically strategic target.  
a)  Impacts at household level  
No literature exists analysing the direct costs that households experience due to terrorist 
attacks itself, or due to subsequent disruptions of the economy (e.g. loss of employment). 
Nevertheless, some innovative approaches attempt to value the loss in life satisfaction and 
welfare that households experience due to the fear that acts of terrorism induce. As fear is 
highly subjective it cannot easily be measured. Still, economic methods such as contingent 4 ECONOMICS OF INSECURITY – ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS 
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valuation or the hedonic market approach can be employed to estimate the “price” of fear. 
Frey and Lüchinger (2005) and Frey, Lüchinger et al (2004, 2006) combine indicators of 
welfare (from the Euro Barometer) with three terror indicators to analyse the impacts of 
terrorism on micro-economic happiness in France, the Republic of Ireland and the UK. In all 
three countries, the estimations show that terrorist attacks have a statistically significant 
negative effect on reported life satisfaction. This decrease in life satisfaction is amongst 
other things reflected in the hypothetical willingness of people to pay for the reduction of 
terrorism in the three countries: a resident of Northern Ireland (with average household in-
come) would be willing to pay around 38% of his income for a reduction in terrorist activity; 
residents in London would be willing to forego around 30% of their income; while residents 
of Paris would only be willing to pay around 13% of their income (Frey, Lüchinger et al. 
2006).5  
Ultimately, psychological factors such as fear and changes in life satisfaction and happiness 
can impact on economic behaviour. These non-monetary impacts can translate into signifi-
cant monetary effects at household level but also in the macro-economy, when the psycho-
logical impacts of fear change consumption behaviour (Naor 2006), impact negatively on 
labour productivity or require medical treatment. While impacts of the latter two are not 
discussed in the literature, consumption effects due to changes in life satisfaction and utility 
have received some attention in economic research. Authors such as Eckstein and Tsiddon 
(2004) and Fielding (2003) show a marked decrease in consumption of non-durables related 
to changes in utility due to terrorism in Israel. Interestingly the immediate response to the 
attacks of 9/11 showed an increase in consumer confidence particularly reflected in the con-
sumer demand for durables, which for example Enders and Sandler (2005) explain as being 
driven by “patriotism” that spurred consumption in an act of defiance against the attacks. 
Shieh, Chen et al. (2005) provide an alternative explanation for this increase, pointing out 
that given a terrorist attack is anticipated and the public fully informed short term consump-
tion may deviate from its long-term level. Households may be motivated to increase the 
consumption of certain goods before an announced terrorist attack as a temporary response 
to a shortened lifespan. Thus, rather than relating the increase in consumption to the initial 
attacks on the World Trade Centre, the authors relate the increase in consumption to the 
                                                                          
5 Beyond the impacts on “quality of life”, acts of terrorism can have severe psychological effects that become 
apparent in stress and trauma. Studies from Israel demonstrate these traumatic effects of terrorist attacks: 
children who have experienced a terrorist attack in their community show markedly higher levels of stress than 
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expectation of future attacks which were announced by al-Qaeda and believed to be credible 
by the US Administration. However, in the long run Keyfitz (2004) shows that through their 
depressing effects on consumer confidence, "war jitters" and fears about weapons of mass 
destruction are estimated to have lowered (U.S.) consumption spending by 0.3 percent 
equivalent to a cumulative US$ 40 billion over the past two years. This accords with Llussa 
and Tavares' (2006) conclusion that overall terrorism will decrease consumption. 
Given these potentially significant economic impacts that the psychological effects of fear 
can trigger, approaches to contain fear and thus mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack need 
to be identified.6 Although the causes of fear are a psychological rather than an economic 
problem7, a small body of economic literature exists that attempts to shed light on some 
determinants of the fear caused by terrorism. One factor discussed in the literature is the 
phenomenon of “probability-neglect”. Research has produced evidence that people base 
their risk analysis on cognitive experiences of past events rather than actual probabilities of 
future events. In Kunreuther’s words, they employ the “availability heuristic” (Kunreuther 
2002), which in the case of terrorism can lead to an over-estimation of high impact-low 
probability events such as a terrorist attack8, whereas the possibility of lower impact-higher 
probability events may be underestimated (e.g. car accidents). In other words, terrorism 
although less likely to implicate the ordinary citizen, will produce more fear than more 
probable risks (Downes-Le Guin & Hoffman 1993; Sunstein 2003; Viscusi & Zeckhauser 
2003; Becker & Rubinstein 2004).9 As risk aversion and fear impact significantly on con-
sumption in specific and economic behaviour in more general, more research is needed to 
identify how citizen’s fears can be contained. 
b)  Impacts on private sector  
Businesses and firms have been direct and indirect victims to both domestic and trans-
national terrorism for a long time. According to the US Department of State, US businesses 
                                                                          
discovers signs for the traumatic impact of terrorist attacks in the 35% increase of fatal accidents after a terrorist 
attack in Israel. 
6 In fact, as one of the objectives of terrorists is to cause fear, minimising fear after a terror attack, also implies 
minimising the actual benefits received by terrorists from their violent action. 
7 The psychological impacts of terrorism have for example been discussed by Katiuscia, S., Galletto, V., and 
Blanzieri, E., (2003). "How Has the 9/11 Terrorist Attack Influenced Decision Making?" Applied Cognitive Psy-
chology 17(9): 1113-27; and Pyszczynski, T., Sheldon Solomon and Jeff Greenberg (2003). In the wake of 9/11: 
The psychology of terror,. Washington, American Psychological Association. 
8 Even in countries which experience sustained terrorist events such as Israel or the Basque Region death rates 
due to terrorism are very low: 0.01% and below (Naor, 2006). 
9 These kinds of anomalies do not only occur with terrorism but also in other contexts of risk perception (Viscusi 
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constituted over 80% of terrorist attacks in 2000 and nearly 90% in 2001 (Michel-Kerjan & 
Pedell 2007). One of the reasons for this increase is that companies source from, operate in 
and supply to insecure countries, thus exposing themselves to greater likelihoods of terror-
ism; a second important reason are substitution effects of terrorists who shift their attention 
from better protected public buildings towards relatively easier to attack targets (ibid) 
The actual impacts of direct losses depend on the characteristics of the company but mainly 
on the nature of the attack and its impacts which may include e.g. property damage or ran-
som payments for hostages. Overall, Enders & Sandler (2005) conclude that even if some 
sectors may face significant losses from terrorism, they are likely to recover quickly, given 
that the economy does not face sustained terrorist attacks.  
While direct physical losses without doubt hurt companies, 9/11 has shown that it is disrup-
tions in the interconnected economy which impact on businesses most severely. Even if 
businesses are not directly exposed to the physical destruction of a terrorist attack, terrorism 
can impact on companies through increasing their overall level of market risk, credit risk, 
operational risk and business volume risk. Furthermore, stock market reactions to a terrorist 
attack, partly induced by the fear to lose capital, partly based on speculative behaviour on 
future gains (or losses) of a company, can be detrimental to a company.  
In this context, the danger of supply chain interruptions has received much attention in the 
literature. It has been estimated that business interruptions accounted for one third of the 
entire losses from 9/11 (Kleindorfer & Saad 2005). In general, companies experiencing 
supply chain disruptions under-perform their peers significantly in stock performance as 
well as in operating performance as reflected in costs, sales and profits (ibid).  
This illustrates that it is not shocks on their own which create cataclysmic events but vulner-
abilities of the economic system which determine the impacts of an exogenous shock such 
as a terrorist attack. These vulnerabilities may arise from actual technical factors (e.g. the 
physical inter-dependence on the economy through communication, transport, etc.) but also 
more elusive factors such as expectations on the functioning of the economic system: 
“longer paths and shorter clock speeds provide more opportunities for disruption and a 
smaller margin for error” (ibid). Recent terror attacks such as 9/11 seem to have deliberately 
taken advantage of these vulnerabilities striking targets of economic significance which led 
to a break down of economic activity even beyond the immediate target area. In contrast, 
attacks on targets of “mere” symbolic or political value are less likely to cause disruptions 
beyond the actual geographical locality of the attack. This recognition is important in so far 4 ECONOMICS OF INSECURITY – ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS 
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as reducing the economic impacts of terrorism should not only focus on the actual threat 
itself but has to take into consideration, to what extent the economic system while having 
become more resilient in certain respects has become more vulnerable in others (Kunreuther 
2006) and whether these vulnerabilities can be minimised without compromising economic 
efficiency and effectiveness.  
Apart from the direct and indirect disruptions, the private sector has to carry the burden of 
psychological impacts of terrorism; on the one hand, in their function as employers, on the 
other in their function as management decision makers being influenced by their own psy-
chological reactions. As mentioned above, no rigorous analysis beyond anecdotal evidence 
exists that elicits the impacts of fear of employees on the private sector. The case of the 
bombings of the London public transport system on July 7th, 2005 shows that it could be 
significant. Some firms reported that they had to find alternative means of transport for their 
employees unwilling to use public transport into central London. For smaller firms this even 
constituted the principal cost of the attack (London Chamber of Commerce, 2005). But it 
remains unknown how significant these impacts are for the cost structure of companies or 
for labour productivity.  
The available literature how terrorism impacts on management decisions will be reviewed in 
Section   5.1.1 below. 
c)  Impacts on public policy / public sector  
Apart from households or consumers and the private sector, the public sector is the third 
economic agent, who is directly and indirectly affected by terrorism. There is scant explicit 
literature on the direct economic impacts that terror inflicts on governments. While an esti-
mate of the costs to the US government arising from 9/11 has been given above, the costs 
arising from physical destruction from smaller scale terror attacks in general are not esti-
mated but they are likely to be relatively small.10  
Yet, potentially more significant, public sector policies before and after a terror attack are 
critical to contain and mitigate the economic impacts of a terrorist attack, restore order and 
confidence in the economy. Necessary policies can be differentiated according to their tim-
ing: on the one hand, governments have to build their emergency response preparedness 
                                                                          
10 These costs arise whenever public infrastructure or buildings are destroyed in a terrorist attack, which can 
vary from government buildings, publicly organised transport and services infrastructure but also military struc-
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before an attack; on the other hand, they have to institute appropriate short run policies in 
response to an actual terror event.  
With regards to the first, health sector policies are particularly important to mitigate the 
impacts of terrorism. Any large-scale terror attacks will put the public health infrastructure 
to the test, having to deal not only with mass casualties resulting from the event, but also the 
longer term impacts of physically and psychologically incapacitated victims. Organizing an 
effective response challenges government institutions because the issues involved -eligibility 
for health care, the effects of low-level exposure to toxic agents, stress-related illnesses, 
unlicensed therapeutics, financial compensation, etc- are complex and controversial (Hyams, 
Murphy et al. 2002). Aggravating although the use of biological and chemical weapons as 
agents of warfare and terrorism has so far only occurred sporadically11, recent events dem-
onstrate the increasing risk and possibility that terrorist groups may employ them against 
civilian targets, as was demonstrated by the release of anthrax in the United States. It is 
expected that agents such as Bacillus anthracis and Yersinia pestis could leave hundreds of 
thousands dead or incapacitated (Evans, Crutcher et al. 2002). The impact of the attack will 
depend on a number of variables, including the agent used, method of dispersal, but espe-
cially preparedness of the public health system to respond appropriately. Contingency plan-
ning so far almost exclusively involved detection, containment, and emergency health care 
for mass casualties. However, it is clear that even small-scale CBN incidents, like the spread 
of anthrax spores through the mail, can cause widespread confusion, fear, and psychological 
stress that have lasting effects on the health of affected communities and on a nation's sense 
of well-being (ibid). 
Even though the preparedness and structure of the public health sector appears to play a 
significant role in mitigating the short and long term economic effects of a terror attack, so 
far it has received little attention in the security economics literature. The only contribution 
which was found in this respect is a statistical model assessing the effectiveness of the anti-
biotic prophylaxis that 10,000 people received in the United States to prevent a further 
spread of anthrax. This study concludes that in the absence of the medical intervention, the 
outbreak could have been about twice as large but it is unlikely to have exceeded 50 cases” 
(Brookmeyer & Blades, 2003).  
                                                                          
11 One widely known incidence of a biological terrorist attack was the dispersion of sarin gas in the subway of 
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Neither the costs resulting from specific attacks nor the costs of different policy responses 
have been accounted for.  
Preparedness to tackle the impacts of a terror attack is only one side of the coin. The right 
response reactions especially through economic policy are critical to restore confidence into 
the economy and thus minimise the negative economic impacts of a terror attack.12 Still, 
there is little rigorous analysis of appropriate monetary and fiscal responses to mitigate the 
economic impacts of terrorism. Baily (2001) in a policy report, outlines and comments 
briefly on US fiscal policies responding to the impacts of 9/11. These policy measures in-
cluded the enactment of tax cuts, distribution of rebate, the discussion of a tax stimulus 
package and the approval of an amount of US$ 40 billion by Congress for emergency spend-
ing measures that included military and security spending as well as reconstruction. Fur-
thermore, the aviation industry was granted support to the amount of US 15 billion. He also 
provides an overview of US monetary policies which followed the 9/11 attacks. Central to 
containing the shocks of the attack was the liquidity that the Federal Reserve Bank13 and the 
European Central Bank added to the system thus allowing cash strapped banks to borrow 
money more easily. Second, a 0.5% point cut in interest rates stimulated spending. Lacker 
(2004) confirms these findings, reviewing the monetary and payment system consequences, 
highlighting that the relatively benign banking conditions helped to make the Fed’s credit 
policy manageable. Based on Lacker’s report and a general overview of the existing litera-
ture conclude that the US’s fiscal and monetary policy responses were critical in attenuating 
potentially even worse economic effects of the terrorist attack (Llussa & Tavares, 2006). 
4.1.2  Impacts across sectors 
Terrorism impacts differently across various economic sectors. Impacts differ depending on 
the nature of the attack and its target, whether a sector is directly hit or whether its activities 
are “merely” interrupted by the disruptions that a terrorist attack may cause. With respect to 
the first, the tourism sector has been a frequent target of terrorism. No analysis exists on the 
economic impacts that direct effects of terrorism have on the tourism industry. Rather the 
literature concentrates on the analysis of changes in demand structures as the predominant 
                                                                          
12 The London Chamber of Commerce in its report on the economic effects of terrorism on London points out 
that even though the attacks on the London public transport system no July 7
th, 2005 caused relatively little 
destruction it significantly decreased the confidence of the business community in the economy (London Cham-
ber of Commerce, 2005) 
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economic impact of terrorism on the tourism industry which will be discussed later in the 
report.  
The transport sector (aviation, maritime transport, road and railways) has been another direct 
target of terrorist attacks, reflected for example in the attacks of 9/11, and the subsequent 
acts in Europe.14 The aviation industry has been particularly conducive to terrorists. In the 
specific case of 9/11, the aviation industry is said to have “lost more in one year than it had 
made in its entire history” (IATA Director General and CEO Pierre J. Jeanniot)15 first, due 
to the incurred physical losses of four airplanes, second, due to subsequent airport closures 
and disruptions in services, thirdly, due to the negative impacts on the value of airline stocks 
and fourthly due to changes in passenger and cargo demand patterns for air transport (Dra-
kos 2004), which will be discussed in section   5.1.2 below.  
Even sectors who are not directly implicated in a terrorist attack can suffer under the conse-
quences of the disruption of the economy. Especially attacks on the transport sector can lead 
to severe delays in the movement of goods and services which have been discussed as “sup-
ply chain disruptions” above. The scale of the impact and which sectors will be affected will 
be determined by the nature of the attack and the target. Once again 9/11 represents an un-
precedented outlier that caused severe disruptions across a wide range of sectors hitting a 
globally significant economic hub. In contrast, even though severe the subsequent bombings 
in London and Madrid did hardly cause any disruptions even in the local economy (London 
Chamber of Commerce, 2005). 
Until today, especially the direct impacts on terrorism have been confined to a relatively 
small set of sectors. This however, does not mean that there are not other sectors which 
could potentially become targets of terrorism in the future. The agricultural sector for exam-
ple has been identified by some as potentially attractive to terrorists, with possibly detrimen-
tal effects not only on the sector itself but also society at large (Chalk 2001). Yet the actual 
degree of risk is contested (Blandford 2002). Even if these policy reports constitute the in-
formed opinion of policy advocacy coalitions rather than scientific papers, the lesson that 
should be drawn is that terrorism could provide surprises by aiming at previously unthink-
able targets.  
                                                                          
14 These attacks include the Madrid train bombings, the attacks on the London public transport system and the 
unsuccessful attempts to bomb commuter trains in Germany. 
15 This statement was made during the opening day of the Airline Financial Summit, New York City, 8 April, 
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Within the sectors affected by terrorism, the insurance sector plays a somewhat special role 
as it neither experiences destruction directly nor is negatively affected by disruptions of the 
economy, but suffers under the consequences of terrorism through ensuing payment claims. 
While insurance companies are able to cover small terror attacks such as sporadic bombings 
with localised impacts, 9/11 dealt a particular blow to the insurance and re-insurance indus-
try, first due to claims at the scale of billions of dollars and second due to negative impacts 
on stock markets which affected the capital base of insurance companies. Consequently, 
9/11 triggered important changes in the insurance market. The main problem that 9/11 
posed, was the number and the volume of simultaneous claims, which exceeded the capital 
insurance companies held (Alexander and Alexander 2002). Claims to insurance companies 
related to 9/11 totalled US$ 50 to 80 billion which was partly paid by primary insurers partly 
by re-insurances. Importantly, while the tragedy of 9/11 unfolded in the United States, much 
of the costs (in total an estimated US$ 1.3 billion) were carried by European insurance com-
panies (ibid). With 9/11, the insurance industry realised that terrorism has reached a new 
scale that does not comply with conventional insurability criteria: since 9/11 it is difficult to 
measure the risks associated with terrorism, which renders it next to impossible to calculate 
insurance premiums accurately (Cummins 2002; Hogarth 2002; Wolgast 2002; Caplan 
2003; Cummins 2003; Ericson & Doyle 2004; Dixon & Reville 2005). In practice, the insur-
ance sector reacted first with raising premiums drastically (between 50-100%) which hit 
particularly shipping and transport companies (airlines)16 (Walkenhorst & Dihel 2002) and 
owners of large commercial property. As the “unimaginable” had happened and led to an 
unquantifiable risk, insurance companies second, announced the exclusion of terrorism cov-
erage unless government support was granted. Intervention of the government in the insur-
ance market, which under normal conditions runs counter liberal market philosophies, has 
therefore received much attention in the literature: the literature analysing different govern-
ment interventions in the insurance market across countries concludes that the case of terror-
ism may represent an instance where public intervention and even subsidies are necessary 
for maintaining some market forces, rather than using regulation (or the lack thereof as was 
common in most OECD economies before 9/11) to stifle the market for terror insurance 
(Brown 2002; Russell 2002; Brown, Cummins et al. 2004; Chalk 2005; Janusz 2005).  
                                                                          
16 Airlines faced an increase of insurance premiums by up to 400%, yet, this was buffered thanks to the airline 
stabilisation legislation which allows for the federal government to pay any rise in commercial insurance (Alex-
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While in general, terrorist attacks are associated to incur costs and losses across sectors, a 
few sectors may in fact benefit from attacks. Berrebi & Klor (2005) assess impacts of terror-
ist attacks during the second intifada on the stock value of Israeli companies differentiating 
between security and non-security industries.17 They find that terror attacks had a significant 
negative impact of 5% on non-defence related companies, in contrast to a significantly posi-
tive effect of 7% on defence and security related companies. These coefficients translate into 
an average loss of US$ 65 million in the market capitalization of non defence-related com-
panies, and an average increase of US$ 53 million in the market capitalization of defence 
related companies, induced by expected increased demand of stock traders. 
4.1.3  Impacts on financial markets 
The large scale impacts of various financial crises in the last century have highlighted the 
significance of financial markets in the economy. Exogenous shocks such as terrorist events 
are generally expected to impact negatively on financial market values. Once again, 9/11 
takes a special place within the literature, yet it is necessary to differentiate the impacts of 
this singular large scale event from impacts of protracted terrorism such as in Israel and 
Spain (Basque country).  
Chen and Siems (2004) who study the impacts of terrorist events on the US capital market in 
comparison to other military attacks18, show that the latter led to substantial negative cumu-
lative returns. In contrast, the event of terrorist bombing attacks19 produced no abnormal 
returns on the day of the attack. The only terrorist attack with a significant impact was 9/11: 
even after six trading days markets showed negative cumulative abnormal returns. Nonethe-
less, they conclude that the magnitude of the shocks were even if significant, still not with-
out precedent in history, i.e. the reaction to the attack was less severe than reactions to pre-
vious shocks. In accordance with others (e.g. Enders and Sandler 2005; Enders and Sandler 
2005; Brück 2006; Llussa and Tavares 2006), they conclude that the contained shock of the 
financial and stock markets are largely due to increased resilience of US capital markets to 
exogenous shocks.  
                                                                          
17 Stock market values are a good indicator for the actual economic damage of a terrorist attack, as they pro-
vide information on the expected impacts on future returns and risk perception, given that the speculative ele-
ment on the behaviour of others is kept in mind (Frey, Lüchinger, et al (2004). 
18 These military attacks include the invasion of France (1940) or North Korea (1950). 
19 The terrorist attacks incorporate are the bombing of Pan Am (December 21, 1988), the World Trade Center 
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In comparison, protracted events in smaller markets can have significant impacts as illus-
trated by Eldor & Melnick's (2004) study of the impacts of the Israeli capital markets. Ana-
lysing the impacts of terrorist attacks on stock and foreign exchange markets in Israel (1990 
– 2003), they find that suicide attacks have permanent impacts on both markets, while other 
type of attacks do not; overall, the Israeli Palestinian conflict reduced the stock market capi-
talization substantially. Interestingly, they find that even after continued experiences with 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict the stock market still reacts to suicide bombings, which may 
be explained by the fact that stock purchases are not just based on the expectation of the 
future value of the firm but also on the expected behaviour of others. Accordingly, Abadie & 
Gardeazabal (2003) show this negative relation between terrorism and stock market values 
in the case of the Basque country: With the announcement of the cease fire, Basque stocks 
outperformed non-Basque stocks, while at the end of the cease fire, Basque stocks showed a 
negative performance. 
In summary, while the impacts of a large-scale singular event in a comparatively well diver-
sified capital and stock market may be relatively short lived and small (Llussa and Tavares 
2006) the impact of protracted terror events, even if smaller in scale in relatively less diver-
sified markets may create lasting negative impacts. 
4.1.4 Macro-economic  impacts 
While a micro-economic analysis provides a disaggregate account of the impacts of terror on 
different agents and elements of the economy, an aggregate analysis identifying the impacts 
on various macro-economic variables sheds light on the repercussions of terrorism on the 
overall state of the economy. In this context, the literature focuses on two key variables to 
show the direct impacts of terror attacks, namely economic growth and trade. 
a) Growth   
The literature in general finds that impacts of terrorist attacks on growth are short-lived. It is 
estimated that 9/11 caused losses in US productivity amounting to US$ 35 billion, 47 billion 
in total output and a rise in unemployment by almost 1% in the following quarter (Sandler 
and Enders 2004). Still, overall these impacts appear to have had relatively little significance 
for the US economy thanks not only to the latter’s size and maturity but also due to prudent 
government policies which have been outlined above (ibid).20 
                                                                          
20 It is methodologically difficult to clearly relate growth dynamics to terrorism given that the US economy was 
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9/11 is an outlier compared to repercussions that more frequent smaller scale attacks incur 
especially when they happen in less diversified economies than the United States. The im-
pacts of terrorism on the economies of Spain (especially the Basque country) and Israel have 
been studied in depth and provide illustrative examples. Both case studies show the negative 
impact that terror attacks can have on small scale economies, especially when these attacks 
are not single events but continue over a longer period of time. In the case of Spain, Abadie 
& Gardeazabal (2003) estimate the overall economic effects of terror in the Basque Coun-
try21: after the outbreak of the ETA-campaign in 1975, GDP per capita declined about 12 
percentage points relative to the synthetic control region in the late 1970’s and about 10 
percentage points during the 1980’s and 1990’s. In the case of Israel, Eckstein and Tsiddon 
(2004) estimate that Israel’s per capita output could be 10% higher in 2004, had Israel not 
suffered under terror in the preceding three years. The negative relation between terrorist 
attacks and growth of these two case studies are confirmed at a more general level by Blom-
berg, Hess et al. (2004). Employing a cross country regression with observations from 177 
countries between 1968 and 2000, they find that terrorism depresses economies signifi-
cantly. Importantly, the effect of terrorism is smaller and less persistent than the economic 
impacts of conflict.  
To contextualise these impacts, Tavares (2004) compares the scale of different shocks, 
namely terrorist campaigns, natural disasters and financial crises: he finds that terrorist at-
tacks on civilian and military targets (as opposed to e.g. public or government buildings) are 
the most detrimental, leading to potential decreases in GDP growth of up to 0.25% points. In 
comparison natural disasters have negative and significant impacts, currency crises negative 
and very significant impacts on GDP growth. When standard growth variables are included 
into the analysis terrorism shows in fact no influence on growth. In sum, after taking into 
account additional determinants of income growth22, he concludes that natural disasters and 
currency crises impact on growth, but not terrorism. Similarly, the economic effects of ter-
                                                                          
in the missing counterfactual as it is unknown how an economy would have developed without the terrorist 
attack (Frey & Lüchinger, 2004). 
21 The authors construct a “synthetic” control region to overcome the problem of the counterfactual, using a 
combination of other Spanish regions that resembles the Basque Country before the onset of the terrorism 
campaign. 
22 These determinants include the country’s population—to control for scale effects—, the degree of trade 
openness, the rate of inflation, the share of primary goods exports in merchandise exports, the size of govern-
ment measured as the share of government spending in GDP and the share of government spending in educa-
tion. These variables capture most of the economic indicators shown to be associated with economic growth in 
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rorism on growth are smaller and less persistent than the economic impacts of conflict 
(Blomberg, Hess et al. (2004)). 
Even local economies appear to be able to recover quickly given a certain degree of eco-
nomic maturity. Especially cities and urban areas have been frequent targets of terrorist 
attacks. In theory, terrorism influences settlement patterns and urban areas through a) the 
safe-harbour effect, b) the target-effect and c) the transportation effect (Brück 2006). Terror-
ism could therefore be conceptualised as “tax” on cities (Llussa and Tavares 2006). The 
general consensus of the literature on war and cities in the 20th century shows that espe-
cially in the long-run costs to cities due to destruction are relatively low (Eisinger 2004; 
Brück 2006; Llussa & Tavares 2006), with however exceptions of certain extreme events 
(Glaeser & Shapiro 2001). Even in the large scale even of 9/11, Bram (2002) concludes that 
“although New York City clearly suffered a severe blow from the attack, the major disrup-
tions appear to have been short-lived and conditions are in place to begin a recovery” al-
ready in 2002. 
To conclude, macro-economic consequences of terrorism events are generally modest and of 
short-term nature, especially in large and diversified economies that are better able to with-
stand severe economic impacts through their ability to quickly reallocate capital and labour, 
given the immediate effects are localised. In contrast, the macro-economic effects of terror-
ism attacks for small less developed economies are likely to be much more significant. Es-
pecially when these face sustained campaigns over a number of years, decreases in per cap-
ita GDP are probable (Llussa and Tavares 2006). 
b) Trade   
The second macro-economic variable that receives attention in the literature is international 
trade. Terrorism impacts directly on trade when traded goods and infrastructure become 
targets themselves23, or when an increased level of insecurity stalls trade between countries. 
Further negative impacts arise from increased security measures at for example border posts 
or important transport hubs, which will be discussed in Section   5. Quantifications of the 
trade impact are provided by for example Nitsch & Schumacher (2004) who assess the im-
pact of terrorism on trade between more than 200 countries for the period 1968 to 1979. 
According to their results, countries targeted by terrorism trade significantly less with each 
                                                                          
23 Attacks on trade infrastructure include for example the repeated attacks on oil pipelines in Iraq after the fall of 
Saddam Hussein, which temporarily paralyzed oil exports; or the attack launched on the French super tanker 
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other than countries not affected by terrorism. Moreover, the effect is economically large: a 
doubling of terrorist events in a trading partner’s country is estimated to reduce international 
trade by 4% (ibid). Blomberg and Hess (2005) calculate that, for a given year, the presence 
of terrorism, as well as internal and external conflict is equivalent to as much as a 30 percent 
tariff on trade. This is larger than estimated tariff-equivalent costs of border and language 
barriers and tariff-equivalent reduction through GSPs and participation in the World Trade 
Organisation. In general, the literature agrees that flows of international trade are negatively 
affected by terrorism events (Llussa and Tavares 2006). 
4.1.5  The determinants of the economic impacts of terrorist attacks 
The above section has shown that the economic impacts of terrorist attacks are determined 
by a number of factors, which can be classified into three broad categories: the nature and 
characteristics of terror; the degree to which impacts are mitigated; and the maturity of the 
economy.  
As has been argued above, terrorist attacks differ in the degree to which they harm an econ-
omy depending on some key dimensions including a) the severity of the attack (which influ-
ences the extent of physical damage); b) the frequency of the attacks which results not only 
in the accumulation of direct losses but also in changes in the behaviour of agents; c) the 
target and its direct relevance to the economy, i.e. an attack on a government building, while 
costly, is likely to disrupt economic activity less than an attack on any critical infrastructure.  
The consequent questions are whether terrorist attacks have become more frequent and 
whether its scale has increased and thus whether terrorist attacks have become more severe 
and therefore more costly. Regarding the first, the literature agrees that accounting for the 
cyclical nature of terrorism (Sandler and Enders 2004), overall, there is no increasing trend 
in incidences of terrorism. Still there is an open discussion in the literature: Frey and Lüch-
inger (2002) contend that terrorism incidences have decreased since the mid-1990s, while 
for example Bellany (2007) argues that there is no visible trend at all.  
Regarding the second question, there is agreement that the severity of incidences has in-
creased (Frey and Lüchinger 2002; Enders and Sandler 2005; Human Security Centre 2006; 
Bellany 2007). Enders and Sandler (2002) find that an act of terrorism is about 17% more 
likely to result in casualties compared to the 1970s, which can be explained by the increased 
incidence of bombings in the proportion of deadly incidents, (as compared to hostage tak-4 ECONOMICS OF INSECURITY – ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS 
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ings, assassinations), the high proportion of mostly crowded civilian targets24 and the rise of 
suicide attacks, which have a higher average rate of fatalities. Regarding the distribution of 
terror attacks a shift of incidences of terrorism towards the Middle East, the Persian Gulf 
and to a lesser degree South Asia has been recorded. Collectively these regions carry the 
main burden of international terrorism (Human Security Centre 2005; Coolsaet & Van de 
Voorde 2006; Enders & Sandler 2006). However, it is surely true that Europe and the United 
States even if not experiencing a higher frequency surely suffer under an increased severity 
of terrorism, not least as suicide attacks that are on average more deadly than other inci-
dences, until 9/11 were unconceivable (very much in contrast to countries such as Israel).  
The nature of the attack is not the only factor that determines the actual impacts. The eco-
nomic impacts of terrorism are partly determined by the structure of the economic system 
itself, as argued above and summarised succinctly by Enders and Sandler (2005). The case 
of 9/11 is illustrative for the resilience of a mature, well diversified economy to a large-scale 
shock. Even if the al-Qaeda’s attack caused large scale destruction and disruption of even 
geographically remote economic activity, the economic impacts on the US and the global 
economy remained transitory. In contrast, only two terrorist attacks in Yemen dealt a severe 
blow to its economy which was largely based on its importance as shipping port.25 This 
illustrates the importance of size and diversity of an economy to enable it to absorb shocks 
(ibid). Little attention has so far been paid on how terrorism impacts on small and less de-
veloped economies. Blomberg, Hess et al. (2004) provide some insights confirming the 
above, yet, these are not sufficient according to Enders & Sandler (2005) to provide an ade-
quate picture. Drawing inferences from the factors that stabilise economies, one can con-
clude that developing countries are likely to suffer more under terrorism due to a) limited 
institutional abilities b) small and often fragmented markets c) policy inflexibility in the case 
of high debt burdens.  
Beyond economic factors, Tavares (2004) interestingly points out that the prevalence of 
democratic freedoms and rights may act stabilising, even if not in terms of the occurrence of 
                                                                          
24 These types of attacks account for more than half of all terrorist attacks (Tavares, 2005). 
25 In 2000, a US ship was hit by a terrorist attack while refuelling in Yemen’s shipping port. This incidence was 
followed in 2002 by a terrorist attack against a French tanker. Even though Yemen’s port had a comparative 
advantage due to its location, these two incidences led to the collapse of Yemen’s shipping industry as shipping 
activities were relocated to neighbouring ports. This had sever negative repercussions on Yemen’s overall 
economy, which is largely dependent on its transport hub. 4 ECONOMICS OF INSECURITY – ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS 
 29
acts of terrorism26, at least in terms of reducing economic costs. In other words, his research 
shows that democracies are better able to withstand even a severe terrorist incidence.  
Yet, while the maturity of an economy is important to withstand a terror attack, it is not a 
sufficient condition. As pointed out in the literature, appropriate response reactions, particu-
larly government policies are important to contain the escalation of negative repercussions. 
This, first, is determined at a technical level by the country’s ability to provide relief and 
manage emergency and rescue actions effectively. This is similar to a natural disaster where 
a country’s emergency preparedness is crucial in containing costs. Although not discussed 
explicitly in the literature, anecdotal evidence claims that the preparedness of households 
and private individuals is critical to support relief efforts and mitigate damage.27 Related to 
this, but also related to general economic activity is the preparedness of service providers 
especially of critical infrastructure to remain operational in the event of an emergency and 
therefore to contain the disruption in economic activity which leads to the escalation of 
impacts. Apart from the direct technicalities of emergency response, the ability of govern-
ment institutions to apply appropriate monetary and fiscal policies and restore confidence 
into the economy form crucial part to mitigate impacts. It has been widely argued that well-
orchestrated macroeconomic policies cushioned the blows of 9/11 (Chen and Siems 2004; 
Enders and Sandler 2005). 
4.2  Limitations in the existing literature 
Significant insights have been generated not only since 9/11 but already before about the 
economic impacts of terrorism across a wide range of issues. Still, a number of significant 
knowledge gaps remain with respect to the micro- and macro-economic analysis of the im-
pacts of terrorist attacks. 
4.2.1  Micro-economic impacts  
Most of the knowledge generated to shed light on the economic impacts of terrorism focuses 
on impacts at aggregated level and specific business sectors. Relatively little information has 
been generated on the economic repercussions of terrorist attacks at household level. While 
                                                                          
26 As will be shown in Section IV.3, the relation between democracies and the occurrence of terrorism is con-
tested. 
27 This has been suggested by for example R. Ackermann, vice-president of the International Association of 
Fire and Rescue Services CTIF in his presentation at the European Security Research Conference SCR ’07, 
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a few single events may not cause large interruptions, the section above has shown that 
protracted terrorism can have significant economic implications, especially for small 
economies.  
Yet, no information exists how these costs are then distributed within the economy, and to 
what extent household income streams, and consequently, savings and consumption behav-
iour will be affected. Furthermore, there is also little understanding on the economic impacts 
of psychological traumas of victims and their families, which may incorporate higher spend-
ing on medical bills, absenteeism at work, and a reduction in labour productivity, not to 
mention the reduction in welfare and life satisfaction that households may suffer. Other 
disciplines have studied the psychological impacts of terrorism, economics could add in 
quantifying the significance of these impacts at the micro- and macro-level.  
With regards to the private sector, economic analysis has focused on those sectors and in-
dustries that have experienced negative impacts of terrorism in the past at the expense of 
sectors that may be vulnerable to terror attacks in the future.  
The importance of the public sector to mitigate impacts of terror has also received too little 
analysis. As 9/11 shows, appropriate fiscal and monetary policies were key in ameliorating 
the worst economic impacts. Yet, no rigorous and generalised analysis appears to exist that 
could extract best practices for replication in the case of a similar event. Beyond direct eco-
nomic policies, approaches to contain and manage citizens’ fears appear to be of significant 
importance, yet again little is known on possible actions. Apart from fiscal and monetary 
policy, public preparedness to adequately respond to a terrorism attack has received too little 
attention in the literature. Most importantly, even though the health sector plays a significant 
role in mitigating the impacts of a terrorist attack in the short and long run, is has so far been 
largely neglected in the analysis. Somewhat related to this, is the omission of emergency 
response and rescue teams from the economic analysis. 
4.2.2  Macro-economic impacts  
Given the gaps within micro-economic analysis, congruent gaps in the macro-economic 
analysis arise. First and foremost, no analysis exists on the impacts of terrorism aggregate 
labour productivity resulting from psychological and physical effects on the workforce. 
Further, so far formal studies have mostly concentrated on the economic impacts on indus-
trialised economies. Apart from Blomberg, Hess et al. (2004) aggregate comparison and a 
few single case studies little is known, how terrorism impacts on the economies of develop-4 ECONOMICS OF INSECURITY – ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS 
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ing countries. Yet, as the statistics show, even though large scale attacks are mainly aimed at 
industrialised countries, most actual attacks in fact happen neither in the US nor Europe but 
rather in other regions, specifically the Middle East, and South East Asia, i.e. in small and 
relatively less developed economies.  
When studying the economic impacts of terrorism on developing countries a second issue 
becomes salient that has so far been overlooked: the economic impacts of terror organisa-
tions in host countries or regions (in the case of national terrorism): In Palestine for example 
Hamas, which is labelled a terrorist organization by Israel, the United States and Europe, is 
also a major provider in the health sector of Gaza and the West Bank. This gains Hamas not 
only legitimacy and political support (Hilsenrath 2005) but should have a clear impact on 
the economy. These aspects of terror are surely not only relevant for Palestine but in other 
situations and countries, yet, no formal studies exist on the economic importance of underly-
ing terror activities in contrast to actual terror acts.  
Very limited knowledge is available regarding, spill-over impacts of terrorism on neighbour-
ing countries, be they in the developed or developing world. Especially in the context of the 
economic area of the EU, it would be beneficial to know how terrorism in one member state 
impacts on others, and in return to what extent EU integration is strengthening the resilience 
of national economies and the EU economy as a whole.  
Ultimately, it is not known what the next terror attack is going to be. Given this uncertainty, 
the need to identify how costs of terrorist attacks can be reduced through public and private 
preparedness and cooperation becomes even more relevant. What is currently not under-
stood is how significant appropriate emergency responses across all levels are to minimise 
the economic impacts of terrorist events and prevent an escalation.  
Overall, in order to identify strategies to mitigate the impacts of terrorism, terrorism should 
not be studied in isolation but potential synergies should be identified that buffer economies 
against a variety of shocks from different security threats. Following forms of interrelations 
could be of interest: first, the similarities and differences of security threats regarding their 
economic impact (nature and scale of this impact) and second, potential synergies to miti-
gate these threats. 5 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES 
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5 ECONOMIC  EFFECTS  OF  ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES 
The economic impacts of anti-terror measures have been classified as the “costs of terror-
ism” which result from the actions of both public and private agents to protect themselves 
against the impact of a terrorist attack or to prevent a terrorist attack altogether (Brück 
2006). Estimating these economic impacts requires accounting for direct effects, resulting 
from the expenditures invested in security measures and indirect impacts which derive on 
the one hand from the opportunity costs of these security investments and on the other from 
dynamic effects of externalities and spill over effects. Lastly, the economic impacts of secu-
rity measures should further account for their actual impact on terror behaviour or the effec-
tiveness of the chosen security measures.  
Two broad classifications of security measures can be identified in the literature: Enders and 
Sandler (2006) differentiate between defensive and pro-active security measures: the first 
broadly concentrate on protecting targets from attacks or mitigating the impacts in case of 
attack; the latter concentrate on fighting the threat itself, i.e. target terrorists and terror or-
ganisations in an attempt to undermine their capacity and activities by reducing their re-
source base.  
Frey (2004) in turn classifies security measures not with respect to their object of focus 
(targets versus terrorists) but rather with regards to the adopted approach. He identifies “de-
terrence” in contrast to “positive” or benevolent measures: the first incorporate both “physi-
cal” as well as legal measures aiming to deter terrorists from their activities; the second, in 
reverse point towards measures to create incentives which induce terrorists to replace their 
acts of political violence with non-violent means. 
Importantly, these classifications are not mutually exclusive, i.e. they do not provide alterna-
tive but complementary classifications as illustrated in Table 5-1 below. 
In practice, defensive measures entail direct actions such as investments in security tech-
nologies, and indirect actions including changes in consumption, investment and saving 
patterns to avoid exposure to risk situations.  
“Pro-active measures” on the other hand, incorporate all measures that aim to undermine 
terrorist activity, directly through interrupting their supply of resources including financial 
assets, arms, recruits etc; measures can range from intelligence operations, to military strikes 




Classification of different types of counter-terror measures 
  Defensive policies  Pro-active policies 
Deterrence policies / 
negative incentives  
Increasing the costs of terror 
e.g. surveillance & protection of 
targets 
Decreasing resource endowments of 
terror organisations  
e.g. intelligence and military opera-
tions 
Benevolent policies / 
positive incentives  
Decreasing the benefits derived: 
e.g. decentralisation of targets, 
decreasing media attention  
Increasing opportunity costs of 
terrorism,  
e.g. tackling grievances /root causes 
of terrorism, re-socialisation pro-
grammes 
 
Within these two broad categories, it is possible to identify two sub-categories: defensive 
measures can be differentiated whether they protect singular identified targets or whether 
they attempt to mitigate the impacts of an actual terrorist attack; pro-active measures can be 
differentiated whether they merely target the symptoms or the root causes of terrorism, i.e. 
the underlying grievances, structural and systemic fault lines which necessitate actors to 
employ violent forms to express political opinions.  
The economic literature explains the choice of counter-terrorism measures (especially in the 
case of trans-national terrorism) mainly based on the public-private good nature of security. 
Defensive policies are largely a private good, where benefits of security provision are 
mostly internalised by the investor, while pro-active policies exhibit characteristics of a 
public good (Sandler and Siqueira 2006). Game-theoretic approaches show, that given the 
absence of coordination mechanisms that ensures all to take proactive measures, countries 
will be better off to take defensive measures and free ride on the pro-active measures of 
others in the cases of trans-national terrorism. This consequently may lead to an oversupply 
of defensive and an undersupply of pro-active measures (ibid).  
The public-private good nature of security provision increases the need for cooperation at 
the international level between countries and at national level between the private and public 
sector. The main obstacle herein lies in how to overcome persistent coordination failures 
between different agents to ensure their compliance. Sandler & Siqueira (2006) conclude 
that leadership is apt to lessen inefficiency in providing defensive measures, yet fails to 
improve efficiency for pre-emptive measures. 5 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES 
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When considering the factors that induce or prevent cooperation to enhance security, incen-
tives not to provide security should not be overlooked. Several states (often so called 
“failed” states) are known to tolerate the activities of terrorist organisations in their territory 
in exchange for no direct harm at the expense of other nations, which is referred to as “paid 
riding” by Lee (1988). These counterproductive activities make multilateral cooperation 
even more important (Llussa and Tavares 2006), yet, as the practice shows, not easier (En-
ders and Sandler 2006). 
5.1  Existing studies and research 
The literature on the economic repercussions of security measures is scant and little definite 
conclusions can be drawn. Still, it is possible to show that the economic repercussions of 
countermeasures will vary greatly depending on which measures are adopted and how, by 
whom and in which economic context they are implemented. 
5.1.1  Micro-economic impacts  
Just as in the section above, the underlying micro-economic processes are explained before 
the aggregate impacts at the macro-economic level are analysed. At micro-economic level, 
security measures of economic agents can include direct expenditures on security technolo-
gies or indirect changes in consumption and investment behaviour to hedge against the risk 
of falling victim of a terror attack; in addition, dynamic impacts of these changed consump-
tion and investment patterns have to be accounted for. 
a)  Security measures of consumers and households 
Sound research on measures of households to enhance levels of security hardly exists, even 
after the incidences of 9/11. Consequently, not much more information is available than 
anecdotal evidence such as accounts of panic purchases of antibiotics following the anthrax 
scares in the US in 2001. In contrast, a few very localised studies - summarised by West and 
Orr (2005) – suggest that the American public’s security measures are far less drastic than 
these anecdotes suggest: For example, a 2004 New York Times national survey revealed 
that households have hardly taken action to prepare themselves for a terrorist attack: 61% of 
the respondents had not put together an emergency food kit with water, and 70% stated that 
they had not chosen a family meeting place or communications plan in the event of an attack 
(in West and Orr (2005)). 5 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES 
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However, even if there is little actual investment in security equipment, consumption and 
savings preferences are influenced by security considerations. These changes in demand 
patterns due to risk aversion become visible in the impacts on different sectors of the econ-
omy, some of which as will be seen below have suffered substantial losses due to fear of 
terrorism. As important policy conclusion, Drakos and Kutan (2003) point out that state aid 
to companies suffering from adjustments in consumer demand due to terrorism will be fu-
tile, in cases where demand has permanently changed. 
b)  Security measures of the private sector  
The available options of security measures of companies are very similar to households: 
investment in security equipment and technologies and management decisions to hedge 
against the risk of a terrorist attack, reflected for example in investment decisions. In theory, 
companies that face direct threats from terrorism, have to incur expenses for security tech-
nology, insurance cover and often have to pay a risk premium to their employees in the form 
of higher wages and salaries; actual quantities depend on the nature of the threat and the 
respective sector.  
The underlying factor that drives security spending arises from a company’s and its manag-
ers’ degree of risk aversion. The literature both academic and practical agrees, that risk aver-
sion and the willingness to accept risk varies markedly across time, space but especially 
between individual managers: a study by Ryans and Shanklin shows that in 1980, 82 top 
international officials from US and overseas multinationals ranked terrorism as key barrier 
to investment right after inflation. In contrast PricewaterhouseCoopers 10th Annual Global 
CEO Survey in 2006 concludes that CEOs, after the unprecedented attacks of 9/11, are less 
worried about unforeseen shocks such as terrorism or natural disasters but rather about an 
overregulation of the economy.28 The report further highlights how degrees of risk percep-
tions differ across individual CEOs, across geographic areas; and across economic condi-
tions. Michel-Kerjan and Pedell (2007) arrive at similar conclusions regarding the little 
perceived risk of terrorism in a study which compares the up-take of terrorism insurance 
cover in Germany and the US in the years after the introduction of the respective terrorism 
risk insurance acts. On the one hand, they argue that a suite of factors other than an actually 
                                                                          
28 Although no direct reference to security measures were made in this study, it could be inferred that compa-
nies are more worried about negative impacts of counter-terrorism measures involving security regulations on 
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heightened sense of insecurity29 account for the increased up-take of terrorism risk insur-
ance; on the other, they provide data from a US Treasury Survey, which finds that 90% of 
respondents to a US Treasure survey that did NOT purchase terrorism insurance believe “it 
will not happen to them” (U.S. Department of Treasury, 2005 in ibid).  
Consistent with this low risk perception, McKinsey (2006) finds that only three respondents 
in ten, report that their companies have taken active steps to prepare for any one of the fol-
lowing scenarios that could harm virtually any company: a pandemic, a natural disaster, or 
increased geopolitical instability, such as terrorism.30 In a similar vain, Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers 10th Annual CEO survey shows that “of all the threats, availability of key skills 
and low-cost competition are the two that companies are addressing with significant re-
sources”, whereas terrorism does not induce significant spending (PricewaterhouseCooper 
2007)– both findings accord with Suder's (2004) main argument who points to the necessity 
to incorporate geo-political risk, including terrorism, into risk assessment strategies.  
Higher levels of risk further impact on investment, not only due to a change in allocation of 
resources but also due to an aversion to commit to new projects due to uncertainty (Brück 
2006). Yet, Purnell and Wainstein (1981) conclude that at least in the case of US businesses, 
neither the costs of terrorism nor the consequent costs of security measures seem to impact 
on profitability significantly that US businesses would pull out of countries affected by ter-
rorism. Yet, aggregate patterns of investment flows contradict this optimistic conclusion as 
will be shown below.  
The limited concern about terrorism is not surprising given that only specific sectors are 
likely to face a direct threat; and that indirect terrorist threats work through other channels, 
i.e. changes in demand, disruption in supply chains and other operation risks. In other words, 
terrorism is likely to be addressed within other risk factors. But even if terrorism is ad-
dressed within these wider sets of risks, Buehler & Pritsch (2003) suggest that the corporate 
meltdowns of recent years show that many companies “neither manage risk well nor fully 
understand the risks they are taking”.  
                                                                          
29 These factors include regulatory measures, reduced prices for terrorist coverage and greater concern about 
possible liability under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, should executives be deemed to have failed to protect corporate 
assets. 
30 The McKinsey Quarterly conducted the survey in March 2006 and received 3,470 responses from a world-
wide representative sample of business executives, 44 percent of whom are CEOs or other C-level executives. 
Ranked according to importance, the three most important risks against which companies prepare are major 
regulatory changes (58%); substantial changes in currencies, interest rates or inflation; and a global or regional 
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A potentially even more important reason for the lack of security measures could derive 
from the complexity to manage terrorism risk, which arises from several factors such as the 
interdependent security environment in which businesses are located; the elusive threat and 
dynamic uncertainty created by terrorism; and the significance of government actions to 
increase or decrease the threat level that businesses face. Especially the first and third point 
create large disincentives to security investments, as the effectiveness of protection against 
terrorism is dependent on the level of protection of the weakest link and thus investment by 
one company does not necessarily mean an actually enhanced level of security if other com-
panies or government fail to cooperate.  
In conclusion, it is necessary to ask whether businesses’ little security investments are justi-
fied given the low probability nature of terrorist events or whether they are in fact under-
investing at the possible expense not only of their operations but also society at large, given 
that a terrorist attack can incur costs that stretch far beyond companies’ boundaries as 9/11 
and other events have shown. These intricate interdependencies give rise to the debate about 
public-private partnerships to overcome coordination failures between companies to ensure 
adequate security standards in the industries. As the rest of this section will show, regula-
tions can have significant repercussions on economic competitiveness, which leads back to 
the above mentioned trade off between scaling down on efficiency expectations versus en-
hancing the security of the overall system.  
c)  Security measures at government level 
While private agents’ activities are mainly focussed on enhancing their own level of security 
through protective measures, governments face the responsibility to have to allocate their 
available resources between defensive and pro-active measures. The choice between the two 
is critical especially regarding their actual impact on enhancing the security level of a coun-
try. Enders and Sandler (2006) find that there is a proclivity to favour defensive counter-
terrorist measures over proactive policies, which will result in an equilibrium with socially 
inferior payoffs when compared with proactive responses. Proactive policies tend to provide 
purely public benefits to all potential targets and are usually undersupplied, whereas defen-
sive policies tend to yield a strong share of provider-specific benefits and are often oversup-
plied. The reaction to 9/11 has been a mix of defensive measures, (e.g. security regulations 
at borders and transport hubs), and proactive measures (the invasion of Afghanistan and 
Iraq, and the global pursuit of terrorists). Yet, while governments shoulder the costs of pro-
active measures, it is the private sector and households who appear to be carrying much of 5 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES 
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the burden of e.g. regulatory protection measures by government. It has been estimated that 
the private sector will face about US$ 10 billion a year due to US homeland security meas-
ures, although initially they could be much higher (in the range of US$ 46 billion to US$ 76 
billion) (Stevens 2003). Thus, governments’ regulatory measures to enhance security can 
have significant impacts on the economy. 
This leads to the question of appropriate government involvement in security provision. In 
this respect, the case of security provision in the aviation sector provides an illustrative ex-
ample: The fact that security at one airport can affect the well being of those at other airports 
and elsewhere provides an economic justification for governmental involvement in aviation 
security (Coughlin, Cohen et al. 2002). A fundamental question is whether the role of the 
state should be restricted to setting and monitoring security standards or whether its role 
should also include the financing and implementation of security. In the US, a controversial 
change is that the federal government has assumed responsibility for the actual provision of 
aviation security. Proponents of this change argue that, relative to private provision, public 
provision reduces the incentives to reduce quality through cost reductions. On the other 
hand, a public agency might not provide security services efficiently as it operates in a mo-
nopolistic way. Furthermore, a public agency might provide an excessive amount of security 
and incur unnecessary expenses because it is likely to be judged on its security record and 
not on all the attributes encompassed by air transportation services for consumers. Thus, 
economic theory does not provide a clear answer to what is likely to be a continuing source 
of controversy - the appropriate scope of governmental involvement in aviation security 
(ibid). 
5.1.2  Impacts across sectors 
Congruently to the varying degree to which sectors are implicated directly by terrorist at-
tacks, the economic repercussions of security measures impact differently across sectors. 
Those who face direct risks of terrorism are bound to incur the most costs to protect them-
selves against an attack. Particularly, the transport industry has invested large amounts into 
enhanced security.31 While terrorist attacks on transport and infrastructure have happened in 
the past, it was 9/11 which induced major increases in security measures to be applied across 
the entire transport sector (aviation, maritime transport, road and rail).  
                                                                          
31 The figures given below, are based on estimates shortly after 9/11, thus, they are provided merely to give a 
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The aviation industry surely was the sector strongest hit by security measures, first due to 
stringent security regulations introduced after 9/11, and second due to severe drops in de-
mand in cargo as well as passenger traffic due to risk-averse customers. Since 9/11 it has 
been estimated that airlines have spent US$ 43 billion on security measures, including more 
thorough baggage checks, greater in-flight inspection and new regulations for secure cockpit 
doors (World Bank 2003, in Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2004). In the US, the 
US Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 estimated the cost to the federal gov-
ernment at around US$ 9.3 between 2002 and 2009. Airport operator’s additional costs are 
expected to be around US$ 56 million annually (Coughlin, Cohen et al. 2002). Some of 
these costs have been shifted to customers: in response to the enhanced security, many air-
lines have started to add “security surcharges”, resulting in fee increases of up to US$ 8 per 
person or within the range of US$ 0.10 to 0.15 per kg of cargo (Walkenhorst and Dihel. 
2002).  
In the shipping industry, a series of measures aimed at strengthening maritime security have 
been adopted by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) which includes for example 
the International Ship and Port Facility Code (ISPS) in December 2002. The costs of imple-
menting the ISPS to ship operators (including the installing of security equipment) has been 
estimated to reach US$ 1.3 billion and ongoing operating cost of around US730 million 
annually. System wide procedural changes though difficult to account for, have been esti-
mated to cost US$ 282 million. The overall costs of those transport counter-terrorism meas-
ures were estimated in 2003 to amount to over US$ 2 billion (OECD 2003, in Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (2004).  
Yet, increased security may not only incur negative impacts. At least in the case of the fi-
nancial sector, the introduction of tighter monitoring of financial transactions seems to have 
had some positive returns. As a survey32 on Anti-Money Laundering (AML) initiatives in 
the banking and financial sector implemented by PricewaterhouseCooper (2005) shows, 
AML initiatives are seen to contribute to improve competitiveness in the long run, though if 
implemented unevenly across countries, can disadvantage those with more stringent re-
quirements. Even if AML initiatives are one of the biggest drivers of increased compliance 
costs in the Western hemisphere and smaller banks are beginning to feel the pressure and 
complain about this new regulatory burden, the industry in general believes that the ap-
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proach is justified within the current (in-) security environment and the role of financial 
flows.  
In general, security investments could contribute to improving efficiency and effectiveness 
of specific sectors and the economy as a whole, especially where security against terrorism 
can be coupled with general security issues (DfAT, 2004). Yet, so far no analysis exists that 
demonstrates potential positive impacts of enhanced security on overall operations.  
Apart from the direct costs that sectors incur to protect themselves and society against ter-
rorism, changes in demand and consumption patterns, arising out of security concerns of 
clients and customers as discussed above have had significant impacts on those sectors, 
through which customers face a direct risk of terrorism.  
This first includes the transport sector, and specifically the aviation industry which has re-
ceived most attention in the literature. Airlines had already been facing difficulties before 
9/11; the subsequent drops in demand which hit particularly American airlines led to esti-
mated losses for IATA members of US$ 15 billion in 2001 (Drakos 2004) and an additional 
aggregate loss of US$ 12 billion in 2002. Boeing Commercial Airplanes announced a 30,000 
manpower reduction (Hooke 2006). It is noteworthy, that the low cost sector did not suffer 
under this decline: Southwest, jetBlue in the US and Ryanair and Easyjet in Europe did not 
only grow but were among the few to record profits and positive cash flows (ibid).  
Tourism is the second sector which suffers significantly under changes in demand due to 
risk aversion. For Spain, which has not only suffered under ETA but also other (mostly left-
wing) terrorist groups, it has been estimated that a typical terrorist act scares away over 
140,000 visitors, combining all monthly impacts (Enders and Sandler 1991). Enders, Sandler 
et al. (1992) estimate the actual losses in tourism revenue for Austria, Italy and Greece to 
amount to US$ 4.538 billion, US$ 1.159 billion and US$ 0.77 billion respectively between 
1974 and 1988.33 For the same period, continental Europe as a whole lost US$ 16.145 billion 
due to terrorism (total tourist revenues in 1988 were US$ 74.401 billion).34 This highlights 
on the one hand, the significance in tourism losses, on the other, the variability of losses 
across countries. While Austria, Greece and continental Europe as a whole lost substantial 
portions of their revenues (40%, 23% and 21% respectively) the losses in Italy amounted 
                                                                          
33 This was calculated in 1988 terms, using a real interest rate of 5%. For comparative purposes, total revenues 
in these countries in 1988 amounted to $11.149 billion, $19.311 billion and $3.29 billion respectively. 
34 Note the methodological difficult to find an appropriate counterfactual: not the number of tourists before the 
attack should be taken as point of comparison, but the estimated increased number at the time of the terrorist 
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“only” to 6%. Negative relations between terrorism and tourist demand have also been ob-
served in other countries, including Israel and Turkey. Fleischer and Buccola (2002) esti-
mating a supply and demand model of the Israeli hotel industry between 1992 and 1998 
estimate a 1.27% loss of total revenues over this period, which rises with a deterioration of 
the situation.  
Not only impacts but also the immediacy with which these impacts come into effect seem to 
vary strongly: while Enders and Sandler (1991) and Fleischer and Buccola (2002) find rela-
tively immediate effects of terrorism on tourism, i.e. after two to three months for Spain and 
Israel respectively, Enders, Sandler et al. (1992) find a ¾ lag before terrorism affects tour-
ism in Greece, while tourism remains unaffected by a terrorist incident until a full 18 to 21 
months afterwards in the case of continental Europe and Austria respectively. Frey, Lüch-
inger et al. (2004) explain these variations with the differences in the structure of terror 
campaigns not just across countries but also across time (Frey & Lüchinger, 2004). Differ-
ences in time lags could further stem from differences in booking systems, where existing 
bookings are kept while changes only become apparent in the number of new bookings.  
Even if impacts are significant, research shows that these effects are transitory even short-
lived, yet, it provides no unambiguous conclusion regarding the relationship between con-
tinued attacks and permanency of impacts: Aly and Strazicich (2000) studying annual bed 
nights in Egypt and Israel conclude that the impacts on the tourism sector remain transitory 
despite continued acts of terror and regional instability. Pizam and Fleischer (2002) in con-
trast, focusing on Israel argue that tourist destinations can recover even from severe acts of 
terrorism, as long as the terrorist acts are not repeated. Thus, when acts of terrorism - 
whether of high or low severity - occur at high frequency and regular intervals, tourism 
demand will constantly decrease, and eventually the destination's tourism industry will come 
to a standstill. It is interesting to note, that the frequency of attacks seems to impact on ter-
ror, while the severity of an attack seems not to influence tourism demand.  
A second effect which has been researched is trans-boundary impacts of terrorism on other 
tourist destinations, especially neighbouring countries. Of importance here is Drakos and 
Kutan's (2003) study on spill over and contagion effects. Using monthly data for the period 
1991 to 2000 they investigate the effect of terrorism in Greece, Israel and Turkey on each 
other’s market share, with Italy serving as a control country, representing the rest of the 
Mediterranean region. They find significant substitution effects as well as empirical evi-
dence for contagion effects. Only around 11% of aggregate losses in market shares are di-5 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES 
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rected toward other destinations within the group of countries under consideration, whereas 
around 89% flow out into safer regions (in Frey, Lüchinger et al. (2004). This demonstrates 
the necessity to consider the usefulness to understand fears of tourists to base strategic and 
operational marketing strategies on them Dolnicar (2005).  
Yet, even sectors who do not explicitly invest in terrorism can be negatively affected by 
security measures. As shown above, some of the costs of security investments in the trans-
port sector have been passed on to clients rather than having been fully internalised by the 
companies themselves. Consequently, trading sectors relying on their services will face 
increased costs not in the form of higher transport fees but also in the form of longer trans-
port durations and delays as will be shown in Section   5.1.3 below.  
In contrast to these negative repercussions, those sectors providing security technologies and 
services, namely the defence and security industries35, benefit from investments into security 
technologies. The military response to the attacks of 9/11 reversed the declining trend in 
military expenditure which had set in with the end of the Cold War (Richard Sykes 2005). 
According to SIPRI, global military spending increased by 18% between beginning of 2002 
and the end of 2003, with the US, Japan, UK, France and China accounting for 64% of the 
world market (note that the US alone spends 47% of the global total). Yet, Sykes (2006) 
does not expect this rise to last, apart from potentially in the US where defence spending has 
increased by over 60% in the past ten years, amongst others for the reason to combat global 
terrorism (ibid). Further, given new characteristics of security challenges, particularly em-
bodied in asymmetric warfare against a clandestine enemy, military expenditure is now 
demanding more flexible, responsive and mobile forces. Thus, the military industry will 
have to adjust its products and services in order to realise this increased demand (ibid). 
The security industry in contrast appears to be experiencing sustainable growth. Available 
estimates put the private security industry’s turnover at between US$ 100 billion and US$ 
120 billion worldwide.36 The largest share is accounted for by the United States, although 
other OECD countries have sizeable security industries as well. For example, Germany’s is 
                                                                          
35 Historically, the security and the defence industry have been clearly separate sectors, the first mainly provid-
ing goods and services to the private sector and households, the latter, mainly supplying goods and services to 
governments. Yet, in the light of new security challenges, these sectors are more and more converging, which 
also explains why these sectors will be treated jointly in this report. The security economy encompasses all 
those products and services which are concerned with preventing, reducing and mitigating harm to life and 
property due to ordinary and organised crime, which according to Stevens (2004) incorporates defence and 
counterintelligence, the public police force, private policing, armed guards and security technology providers. 
36 It is necessary to point to the difficulties to measure the value added of the security industry and spending on 
security mainly due to data but also accounting problems, and therefore the figures are merely an attempt to 
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thought to be around US$ 4 billion and France’s and the United Kingdom’s around US$ 3 
billion (Stevens 2003). There is little evidence within the industry of a major upsurge in 
spending on security since 9/11, however, longer-term data suggest healthy growth in turn-
over in the order of 7-8% annually, easily outstripping average annual economic growth 
rates. Prospects for some segments, including biometrics, radio frequency identification 
(RFID) technologies and computer security are particularly favourable (ibid). But terrorism 
is not the sole driver of the security industry; an increasing trend in organised crime, percep-
tions of increased personal insecurity (ordinary crime has actually fallen since the mid-90s) 
and the characteristics of the global economic system37, which make protection more neces-
sary spur the growth of the security industry and consequently not all growth effects can be 
attributed to terrorism.  
In conclusion, it appears that in the short run the military industry benefited greatly from the 
first reactions to 9/11 while in the long run, it will be the security industry that will profit 
mostly from the new insecurity environment that is posed not just by terrorism but various 
other forms of human induced insecurity. 
5.1.3  Macro-economic impacts  
Ultimately, micro-economic processes and behaviour translate into macro-economic impacts 
which are reflected in various variables. Just as at micro-economic level, it is necessary to 
account for a) the direct results from increased spending in security measures, which trans-
late into fiscal effects, aggregate consumption and investment; b) for the indirect impacts, 
which result from the security measures taken, reflected in e.g. increased transaction costs 
and repercussions on the competitiveness of the economy and c) the aggregate impacts of 
changes in consumption and investment spending which do not result from direct security 
investments but rather from risk aversion. 
a) Fiscal  effects   
In theory, a negative shock such as a terrorist event is expected to incur an increase in public 
security spending (Brück 2006), with the potential effect to retard long-term growth as first, 
high budgets for defence and homeland security may crowd out more growth-enhancing 
investments; and second, there is some evidence that public security spending may also 
                                                                          
37 These characteristics include longer pathways which make products more vulnerable; increased mobility of 
people and thus migration patterns; the vulnerability of information technology; but also global competition which 
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crowd out potentially more efficient private sector attempts to increase security. In fact, 
Stevens (2003) contends that governments and other public authorities have increased their 
overall spending on security, in some cases quite substantially. The US Homeland Security 
budget doubled from fiscal year 2002/03 to its current level (2004) of well over US$ 30 
billion: funding for aviation security is now running at US$ 4.8 billion and for border secu-
rity at US$ 10.6 billion. He concludes that such investments are funded by government taxes 
or private spending. Consequently, even if this will not incur significant budgetary impacts, 
economic impacts will still be significant.  
In contrast, Gupta et al (in Brück (2006)) who analyse the changes in composition of public 
spending in low and middle income countries show that terror and armed conflict leads to 
increases in defence spending with a negative impact on public spending on social and eco-
nomic issues. Thus, they show that the fiscal effects of defence and security spending in 
medium and low-income countries can have a significantly negative fiscal impact and con-
sequences for future economic growth. 
b) Growth 
Related to the fiscal impacts of security spending but more complex is the relation between 
security spending and growth. A large body of literature exists discussing on the one hand, 
the impacts of defence expenditure on economic growth (Ram 1995; Cohen, Mintz et al. 
2003; Lee and Chang 2006) and analysing potential spill-overs of defence R&D for the 
economy (Lerner 1992; Cowan 1995; Lichtenberg 1995; Trajtenberg 2004). Yet, this litera-
ture does not identify a straightforward relation between the expenditure on defence and 
growth. Various studies show that defence-growth relationships can take many forms: de-
fence spending can have a lagged effect on growth; it may even spur growth in the short run, 
while constraining it in the long run or vice versa. Rather than directly, defence spending 
may impact on the economy through indirect channels. In fact, the causality may even be 
reversed and economic development influencing defence spending. Cohen, Mintz et al. 
(2003) provide a more nuanced analysis differentiating between short and long term, direct 
and indirect impacts and thus provide a more cautious conclusion about both the impacts of 
defence expenditure on the one hand, as well as the impacts of the so called “peace divi-
dend”.38  
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In contrast to the extensive literature on defence–growth relationships which was outlined 
above, hardly any literature exists on the impacts that terror security spending will have on 
economic growth. Baily (2001) concludes that provided fiscal discipline prevails, there is no 
reason to fear that long run growth is compromised for higher security. Rather than in-
creased security spending he points to potential negative effects of a reversal of the current 
state of liberalisation. Baily’s argument accords to Hobijn's (2003) assertion that neither 
private nor public security spending will have a major impact on the US economy estimating 
that private security spending will reduce labour productivity by only 1.12% and multifactor 
productivity by only 0.65% with only small aggregate results on US GDP. Regarding, public 
security spending, he calculates that homeland security spending will reduce output only by 
0.6 % over a five-year period. Judging by the much larger scale of military spending in the 
1980s, he believes that to be negligible and to have no effect on the US budget deficit. Le-
nain, Bonturi et al. (2002) estimate the results of security spending to lead to a reduction in 
real GDP by about 0.7 % after five years.  
However, these results are thought to be too optimistic (Brück 2006). In addition, they were 
made shortly after the 9/11 attacks where the full extent of the counter terrorism measures 
could not be known. Therefore, it is necessary to treat these conclusions with caution. Fur-
thermore, these estimates only refer to security spending in the US, i.e. a large and well 
developed economy with an annual GDP of over US$ 13 trillion. Evoking Gupta et al’s 
(2006) conclusion on the negative fiscal impacts of security spending in low and middle 
income countries, it is possible that security spending could have a significantly retarding 
effect on economic growth in small and less developed economies. 
Another pertinent issue raised in National Research Reports of EU member states39, are 
possibilities for cross fertilisation between military and security technologies. This implies 
that rather than “reinventing the wheel” security R&D should build on existing knowledge 
and available technologies thus using this knowledge more effectively and creating econo-
mies of scale. 
c) Trade 
The literature pays specific attention to the negative impacts of slowed down transport and 
trade flows due to heightened security measures at borders and transport hubs (Brück 2006). 
These “frictional costs” of trade arise not only due to delays at transport hubs and border 
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controls but also due to increased insurance charges and prices for security measures which 
are passed on from operators to clients. In quantitative terms it has been estimated that a 
one-day delay due to border controls costs 0.5% of the value of the delayed good (Hummels 
2002); Leonard (2001) suggests rising trading costs of 1% to 3% ad valorem after 9/11 
(Leonard 2001), (Walkenhorst and Dihel. 2002).40 This increase corresponds to an annual 
increase in production costs of traded goods of US$ 5.6 billion to US$ 16.8 billion (which 
however is hoped to be an upper bound as these estimates were made right after 9/11) (Wal-
kenhorst and Dihel. 2002). Ultimately, with an estimated elasticity of trade flows (in volume 
terms) with respect to transport costs (ad valorem) of -2 to -3.5, Limao & Venables (2001) 
expect trade to reduce by this factor.41 It is necessary to note that these impacts on trading 
costs and subsequently trading volumes will vary across goods as well as trading countries: 
goods with a high value to weight ratio whose share of trading costs already before 9/11 had 
a lower proportion of the value (e.g. pharmaceuticals) are expected to be less affected than 
goods with a low value to weight ratio (e.g. fertilisers) (Walkenhorst and Dihel, 2002). 
In 2001/2002, when these studies were implemented, authors such as Walkenhorst and Dihel 
(2002) expected security measures to abate over time, with an enhanced perception of secu-
rity in the transport and trade sector, yet, given continued attempts to attack infrastructure, 
costs in fact are likely to have increased.  
Yet, not all see these increased investments in security necessarily in a negative light. Mirza 
and Verdier (2006) for example point to the two-way relationship between terrorism and 
trade-openness, which implies that the relative costs and benefits of openness in relation to 
terrorism42 have to be carefully assessed against the costs of enhanced security measures. 
d) Investment   
Last but not least, macro-economic impacts of security measures result from changes in 
investment behaviour due to increased risk aversion. Ryans and Shanklin (1980) in their 
study of 82 executives of leading multinationals in the US show that a firm’s decision to 
expose itself to the risk of terrorism in a host country will be determined by the returns on 
                                                                          
40 Prior to 9/11, estimates of the cost of time delays, paperwork and compliance related to border crossing 
ranged from 5 to 13% of the value of the goods traded. 
41 As pointed out before, these figures were calculated shortly after 9/11 and are not based on empirical evi-
dence but rather on crude estimations and assumptions. They are provided as more recent and accurate figures 
do not exist and to show the possible effects, even if they are merely hypothesised. 
42 Such assessment should not only focus on benefits to counter terrorism but should incorporate an analysis to 
what extent security measures against terrorism could enhance overall system security against a variety of 
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the investment, which must be considerably greater than under normal conditions. Thus high 
returns on investment are likely to be the reason for Purnell and Wainstein’s (1981) finding 
that despite potential difficulties businesses will not pull out of a country but rather cope 
with terrorist threats or attacks as with other acts of violence.43  
Yet, in contrast to the relative manageability of terrorism that these micro-analyses suggest, 
aggregate studies are more pessimistic about the relation between terrorism and capital 
flows. Frey, Lüchinger (et al. 2004) based on studies of Spain and Greece find that pro-
tracted political insecurity through terrorism will have significant negative impacts on for-
eign investment inflows. Capital inflows to Spain deceased by 13.5% on average over the 
period 1968 to 199144; Greece which was plagued by two major terrorist organisations in the 
same time period, experienced a comparable reduction of direct foreign investment averag-
ing 11.9% annually.45  
At a cross country level, Blomberg and Mody (2005) estimate the quantitative implications 
of violence on international investment. Three findings emerge from their analysis: first, 
violence at home tends to move investment abroad; second, violence in the host country 
deters both trade and FDI flows; particularly strong in developing countries; thirdly, WTO 
membership appears to counter the negative impacts on bilateral FDI flows, which suggests 
that while violence raises political risk and discourages investment flows, WTO membership 
signals a commitment to lower country risk  
As stated above, irrespective of more positive opinions at the micro-economic level, the 
literature on aggregate effects shows that trans-national capital flows are adversely affected 
by measures adopted to avoid the risk of terrorism (Llussa and Tavares 2006). 
5.1.4  Trans-national and global impacts  
9/11 has not only been unprecedented in its scale but also in its global implications. Given 
the inter-dependency of the economic system, local effects have shown to result in magni-
fied global repercussions. This holds not only true for the impacts of the terrorist event but 
also for the economic impacts of security measures. Especially since the perpetrators come 
                                                                          
43 This is consistent with empirical findings of e.g. industrial economies which shows that economic variables 
(linkages into the global market economy, available technological capabilities, etc) are more important than geo-
political factors. 
44 This translates into a decline in real direct foreign investment of almost 500 million dollars, or 7.6% of annual 
gross fixed capital formation. 
45 This translates into a loss amounting to almost 400 million dollars, or 34.8% of annual gross fixed capital 
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from different countries, security policies have incorporated actions with trans-boundary 
reach. While global welfare losses may be small, the impacts on specific regions, especially 
developing countries may be large (Walkenhorst & Dihel, 2002). For example, due to their 
strong dependence on trade with Europe and the US, Southern Asia, North Africa and the 
Middle East suffer the most damage related to changes in trade due to security measures. 
That means that developing countries may be particularly affected by the first- and second-
order effects of terrorism.  
Apart from trade impacts, security related changes in international policy have changed the 
discourse and allocation of aid to developing countries. New practices such as increases in 
aid for military expenditure, employed under the name of counter-terrorism are criticised to 
run counter development objectives and international commitments to human rights (Tujan, 
Gaughran et al. 2004; Beall 2006). Yet, overall, little literature on the global and trans-
boundary economic impacts of security measures is available. 
5.1.5  Impacts on civil rights and democracy  
The debate on the repercussions of Anti-Terrorist Measures on civil liberties and democratic 
rights and freedoms surpasses the scope of this report which focuses on the economic not 
political impacts. However, especially since Tavares (2004) finds a positive relation between 
the resilience of economies and democratic rights, the potential negative repercussions of 
anti-terrorism measures on democratic freedoms warrant at least mentioning and its impact 
on the resilience of economies could be a further field of study.  
Apart from the impacts of security measures on citizens’ rights in terror target countries, the 
impacts of aggressive counter-terrorism measures in terror host countries have been found to 
terrorise innocent citizens (Kivimaeki, 2003). Yet, economic repercussions in the form of 
monetary and welfare losses, which are likely to arise from these measures have not been 
quantified in the literature. 
5.1.6  The determinants of the economic impacts of anti-terrorism policy 
In conclusion, while acts of terrorism have only temporary effects on a mature economy, 
this section has shown that counter-measures to terrorism can extent the impacts of terrorism 
throughout the economy. Compared to the impacts of a terror attack, the determinants and 
outcomes are much more diffuse and more difficult to anticipate and capture. Even though 
empirical proof is scant, the available literature points to the following factors which at least 5 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES 
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in theory determine the economic repercussions of security measures: a) the choice of secu-
rity measures that are adopted, b) how and by whom security is provided and c) the eco-
nomic context in which security measures are implemented and d) the effects security meas-
ures have on future terrorist attacks. 
As this section has shown, the economic impacts of security measures are determined first, 
by the actual type of measures adopted across various economic agents. These not only 
determine the actual overhead investment or financial outlay necessary but also to what 
extent there is scope to create synergies between different security measures. Further, the 
respective security measures will influence the indirect impacts on the economy through e.g. 
impacts on transaction costs and externalities.  
Actual security measures adopted across economic agents are influenced by the perception 
of the actual level of insecurity and the underlying threats and in the case of public agents 
often by political considerations some measures more appropriate to retain the confidence of 
their constituencies and to demonstrate power towards perpetrators (Enders and Sandler 
2006). Thus, especially at government level, the appropriate form to reinstall security (actual 
and perceived) is often seen to lie in aggressive action. Considerations of economic impacts 
which are often distant in the future and not easy to calculate appear therefore to be mostly 
left out of policy considerations.  
As importantly, actual security measures as well as the costs of these measures are deter-
mined by the expected behaviour of other actors. Especially in the case of trans-national 
terrorism, cooperation between countries is essential to maximise the cost effectiveness of 
counter-terrorism measures. Non-cooperation does not only imply that a few actors have to 
bear the costs of the measures, but it also implies given inter-dependent security, that the 
measures are unlikely to be effective, which in turn creates disincentives to invest in certain 
policies. 
Security just as any other good or service can be provided more or less economically effi-
ciently. As the case of airport security shows, one major question that has so far not been 
answered is whether governments or the private sector are better placed to provide maxi-
mum security at minimal costs. Related to this, in theory, economic repercussions will fur-
ther differ depending on the mechanisms and approaches – e.g. market mechanisms versus 
regulations- that are employed to induce security provision. Brück (2006) models the impli-
cations of security spending, which could be voluntary, in response to market forces, or 
forced due to new security regulations and legislation: While the first scenario (voluntary 5 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES 
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security spending) is akin to an insurance spending, the second (responses to market forces) 
may result in higher costs, yet at the same time could prevent or even raise revenues, while 
the third (regulated security spending) is congruent to an environmental regulation, increas-
ing social welfare, at the expense of producers with the effect of an overall decrease in the 
industry’s productivity (ibid). 
Lastly, the ability to coordinate security measures across economic agents not only within 
but also between economies is likely to impact on economic repercussions in two ways: 
first, given the inter-dependence of security and insecurity, a failure to coordinate measures 
across all links of a system may render individual security investments impotent, therefore 
rendering no or negative returns to the investment, second given potential negative impacts 
of competitiveness on involved economic sectors, the economic repercussions of security 
provision will also be determined by the ability to coordinate security measures across com-
petitors in different economies. 
Even though little information is available, Gupta et al (2004) (in (Brück 2006)) suggest that 
security spending will impact differently on different sized economies; not surprisingly, as a 
certain level of security spending implies a higher share in overall spending in a smaller than 
in a larger economy. However, as the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT) argues, especially for developing economies, spending on security measures can 
imply an investment into investor confidence and therefore boost economic development. 
Hypothetically, basic investments to enhance security could impact positively on a smaller 
“less secure” economy up to a certain level, increasing its resilience as well as confidence of 
economic players in it. This effect could level off, the more developed the economy is, while 
in fact, reverse, i.e. create negative repercussions in highly developed and open economies 
due to negative impacts on economic efficiency. This however, is a hypothesis and the ac-
tual dynamics between security and economic development require more careful research. 
Related to this, wherever investments in security technologies are necessary, the economic 
impacts will differ depending on whether an economy is net importer or exporter of these 
technologies. If an economy’s security sector is sufficiently large and competitive, this sec-
tor and the aggregate economy are likely to gain from increased investments in security. 
Yet, on the other hand, countries which do not produce necessary security technologies will 
need to import these goods and services, which implies a leakage in the economy. Thus, 
economic effects of security spending will partly be determined whether a country is a net-
importer or exporter of security technologies and services. 5 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES 
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Last but not least, long run costs of security measures will be determined by their actual 
impact on terrorist behaviour. In sharp contrast to security threats emanating from e.g. natu-
ral disasters or industrial accidents, human drivers of insecurity deliberately seek to under-
mine security measures. In the best case scenario, security policies will be effective and acts 
of terrorism will cease; however, in the worse case scenario, terrorists will adjust their be-
haviour to undermine security measures which may result in more severe actions and thus 
increased costs from terror activity. As Enders and Sandler (2006) show these considerations 
are not merely theoretical but reality, however, these costs are often not incorporated into 
cost-benefit analysis of policy measures. 
5.2  Limitations in the existing literature  
The economic repercussions of security measures are rather less understood than the impacts 
of terrorist events. As the survey above shows, the available information is patchy, much 
based on theoretical reasoning and estimates especially with regards to the indirect impacts 
of security spending on growth, efficiency and competitiveness, with only little rigorous 
empirical analysis.46 
5.2.1  Micro-economic analysis  
The first critical knowledge gap which makes it difficult to assess the economic repercus-
sions of security measures is the limited information on the actual measures taken across 
various economic agents. Even though it has been established that fear and uncertainty can 
have significant impacts on consumption, savings and investment behaviour (as well as 
political decisions which can have repercussions on the economy) little empirical knowledge 
is available how and in what directions the supposed increase in insecurity has impacted on 
security behaviour across economic agents in the EU. Analysing these economic patterns 
could also shed light on the extent to which EU member states have succeeded in restoring 
confidence into the security of their economies.  
Similar to the lack of information regarding the economic impacts of terrorism at household 
level, there is no empirical information how costs and benefits of security measures are 
passed on to the micro-level, e.g. through changes in fiscal policy (taxes) to cover costs, or 
through price changes.  5 ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES 
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Further, especially in the case of trans-national terrorism, which incorporates the involve-
ment of perpetrators of nationalities other than victims, no information is available how 
security measures impact on perceptions on these nationalities or more generally different 
ethnic groups in target countries. Security measures levelled against a certain nation could 
stigmatise people of certain nationalities and ethnicities and these discriminatory impacts 
could have repercussions labour markets in specific and social cohesion in general. 
5.2.2  Macro-economic analysis  
Congruent to the lack of knowledge on actual security measures taken by various economic 
agents, there is insufficient information on the repercussions of these security measures 
beyond back of the envelope estimations and theoretical deliberations. While the costs of 
9/11 have been accounted for comprehensively in various studies, the costs of security 
measures have never been estimated methodically. This is not surprising given that many of 
especially the indirect impacts (e.g. increased frictional trading costs, etc) occur only in the 
medium to long run and the most significant measures have only been introduced after 9/11. 
Nevertheless, six years after this decisive event, it is now time to carefully re-assess the full 
economic repercussions across various economies including cross-border effects and exter-
nalities.  
Especially in the case of trans-national terrorism, no information exists on the repercussions 
of security measures on countries that are direct targets of these security measures, due to 
their involvement in terrorism as “host states”. Accounts from terror host states show that 
governments adopt often brutally repressive measures to fight terrorism on their territory. 
Yet, the economic impacts of these measures remain unaccounted for. The analysis of the 
economic impacts of security measures in less developed countries is of particular impor-
tance as lack of economic development and opportunities are (although not unambiguously) 
associated to provide fertile ground for terrorist recruitment.  
Last but not least, at a more conceptual level just as terrorism as a form of insecurity should 
not be analysed in isolation from other security threats, security measures to counter terror-
ism should be assessed in comparison to other forms and levels of security. Of specific in-
terest is whether synergies can be created between security measures which target different 
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literature does not neatly differentiate between the two cost elements. Rather, it lumps the economic repercus-
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types of security threats. Beyond specific case studies, a generalised analysis is lacking 
which studies the relation between security, insecurity and economic growth and develop-
ment, not only with the viewpoint of enhancing security against terrorism but by integrating 
terrorism within the larger security agenda.  
If a trade-off exists between security from terrorism and economic security, criteria should 
be developed to identify the optimal level of security. This should be related to a revision of 
the actual objectives of security, whether to decrease an uncertain terrorist threat in isolated 
fashion or whether to enhance system stability. 6 INTERACTION OF ACTORS OF INSECURITY AND SECURITY 
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6  INTERACTION OF ACTORS OF INSECURITY AND 
SECURITY 
The last section concentrates on the dynamics between “actions of security and insecurity”. 
As Enders and Sandler (2006) point out security measures often do not take their full dy-
namic costs into consideration failing to recognise that terrorist behaviour is not static but 
adapts to security measures. This adaptive behaviour implies in the long run that the full 
economic repercussions of security measures have to account for the costs of terrorist at-
tacks in the next time period which may not decrease but in fact increase in response to 
security measures. Moreover, terror may not only increase over time, but also shift geo-
graphically, taking advantage of weakest links in relatively less protected areas.  
The literature has identified “stylised facts” of the dynamics of terrorism. Even though these 
models have proven useful, they nevertheless are too limited to explain all the various out-
comes that have been observed in reality. 
6.1  Existing studies and research 
6.1.1  What determines terrorist behaviour  
The literature builds on some key assumptions to analyse the dynamics of security policies: 
all subsequent arguments are based on the essential understanding that terrorism is not a 
random phenomenon (Drakos and Gofas 2006). Rather, economic theory shows that terror-
ists behave like any other economic agent - rational, which implies that they face a well 
defined set of preferences, and will select their preferred choice of action to maximise utility 
within a given resource constraint (Enders and Sandler 2006). At the most basic, terrorists 
face the choice to allocate their resource endowments between terrorist and non-terrorist 
action in order to achieve a political goal; within the category terrorist action, terrorists can 
choose from a variety of modes and forms of terrorist attacks. Consequently, theory predicts 
that a change in the relative price of one of the elements of choice will result in a shift of 
terrorist action towards the relatively cheaper activity, be it a different form of terrorist, or 
non-terrorist action.  
Within this framework, even suicide bombers have been modelled as rational agents: at the 
most basic, suicide bombers value the choice of “life in paradise” and worship as martyr 6 INTERACTION OF ACTORS OF INSECURITY AND SECURITY 
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higher than their present life.47 Staying alive in fact may not only imply foregoing paradise 
but also loosing group solidarity in real life (Wintrobe 2001). Beyond merely achieving 
spiritual gain and social standing in the community more tangible motives exist: Azam 
(2005) points to the financial benefits that families of suicide bombers receive as reward for 
the sacrifice; Berman & Laitin (2005) highlight the practicality of self-sacrifice to prevent 
apprehension thus minimising risks of negative consequences for captured terrorists as well 
as for terrorist organisation. Irrespective of the final motive for suicide bombings, what 
matters to this section is that given the rationality of suicide bombers in specific and terror-
ists in general, their behaviour is expected to change with a change in the relative prices of 
alternative actions.  
Yet, the “price” of terrorism as such has no financial equivalent unlike goods and services 
which are traded in the market and whose price is determined by the equilibrium between 
supply and demand. On the one hand, it can be equated with the economic costs that terror-
ists face to execute an attack. These may include not only the actual financial outlays for 
inputs such as weapons and explosives, information, etc. but also the risks of failure of at-
tacks leading to capture of recruits. On the other hand, the price (or value) of a terrorist act is 
determined by the benefit incurred of a successful attack. Authors such as Enders, Sandler or 
Frey remain rather unspecific about the determinants of this value. Phillips (2005) in con-
trast, attempts to shed light on its actual composition through employing a model of equilib-
rium asset pricing. In this model, the “price” or better value of a terrorist attack equals the 
amount of political influence that the agent procures (through terrorism) discounting for the 
risk aversion of terrorists. Both (political influence and risk aversion) are dependent on the 
prevailing level of security of the terrorist target: the value of an attack will be higher in a 
low state of security and lower when the system is in a high state of security. In other words, 
Phillips (2005) concludes that the terrorists’ resource endowments are more valuable to the 
risk-averse terrorists in times of low security and less valuable in times of high security. 
Thus ultimately, Phillips (2005) arrives at the same policy conclusions than Enders & San-
dler (2006).  
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case of Chechnya for example, the preference to commit suicide rather than to stay alive becomes rational 
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Given the assumptions of terrorists as rational agents, the various policy measures which 
were outlined in Section   5 will influence relative costs and resource endowments of terror-
ists and thus derive different response reactions. 
6.1.2  Defensive policies  
a)  Protecting targets against attacks  
Protecting targets aims to raise the costs of an attack by increasing the difficulty for terror-
ists to strike and reach their target and by increasing the risk of failure (Enders and Sandler 
2006). Activities may include the instalment of surveillance technology and placement of 
security personnel such as the introduction of metal detectors at airports in the 1970s or the 
fortification of embassies. Legal measures at national, regional or international level, which 
lead to tightening of legal action taken against terrorists, have conceptually a similar effect. 
Ultimately, all these actions aim to motivate terrorists to refrain from their terrorist activities 
in favour of other political means. 
Enders & Sandler (2006) analyse the effects of some protective measures empirically, in-
cluding the introduction of metal detectors at airports, the fortification of US embassies and 
the passing of international conventions. They show that metal detectors to decrease sky-
jackings have proven effective insofar as they reduced the number of skyjackings by 12.2 
incidents per quarter. However, rather than actually reducing terrorist activity, the introduc-
tion of metal detectors appears to have motivated a shift of terrorist attention from now more 
costly skyjackings towards relatively “cheaper” hostage takings, indicated by an increase of 
3.68 incidents per quarter of the latter (ibid). In contrast, international conventions48 do not 
show to have had a significant effect on terrorist attacks, since these conventions do not as 
such reduce terrorists’ resource base or lower the relative costs of non-terrorist activities 
(ibid).  
However, continued attempts to target for example major airports such as Heathrow, who 
since 9/11 have seen a decisive increase in security measures, contradict the prediction that 
terrorists will seek the weakest link to minimise costs. It appears that they are willing to pay 
higher prices and take on greater risks for a potentially higher return on a more prestigious 
target.  
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b)  Mitigating impacts  
A complementary action to protecting targets is the mitigation of actual impacts, which in 
theory does not raise costs but aims to lower the benefits resulting from a terrorist attack 
(Enders & Sandler, 2006). Frey (2004) suggests two measures to reduce the benefits derived 
from terrorist acts: decentralisation and changes in media reporting practices.49 Decentralisa-
tion or “poly-centricity” aims to make targets less attractive by reducing their physical size, 
and their political and economic importance for the overall. Thus, decentralisation decreases 
the level of immediate inter-dependency and consequently the degree of damage that can be 
inflicted. 
Changes in media practices on the other hand, rest on the recognition that media and terror-
ism live in a certain “symbiosis” (Enders & Sandler, 2006): a terrorist event is a welcome 
story to the media to report on and boost sales; on the other side, terrorists rely on the media 
as the medium to increase the audience of an attack beyond the directly implicated victims, 
and to instil the intended fear in society. As the media determines the “cognitive experience” 
of terrorism by an audience larger than the directly affected victims, and magnifies the im-
pact through continuous reporting of the topic (even at the expense of other topics) it plays 
an important role in “managing citizen” fears either positively or negatively (Kunreuther 
2002). Empirically, Nelson and Scott (1992) who analyse the relation between media and 
terrorism, show that media coverage may induce additional terrorist acts. However, even if 
this positive relationship is significant, no prove exists that a reduction in media coverage 
and subsequent reduction in benefits creates disincentive enough to actually reduce the 
number of terrorist events. In fact, it should be assumed that terrorist organisations can find 
their own means of publicising their successful attacks, not least through the medium of the 
internet, which has become a popular terrorist platform.  
Overall, no empirical study exists that shows the relation between reducing the benefits of 
an attack and its consequences on future terrorist attacks. Therefore, it is left to speculation, 
that terrorists are likely to change their modes of attack, to increase their effectiveness and 
therefore undermine measures to mitigate the impacts of an attack.  
In summary, protective measures seem to induce a suite of substitution effects, which in-
clude a shift in targets, a change in the modes of attack, geographic transference between 
countries or in time (Llussa and Tavares 2006). This implies that theoretically, in order for 
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policies to be effective they will need to address all possible modes of attacks, on all targets, 
in all possible countries, at all times. Given asymmetric information between terrorists and 
governments this however is hardly possible to achieve. This leads back to the question how 
to protect an economic system when the actual threats to security are unknown. 
6.1.3  Proactive policies  
a)  Targeting symptoms of terrorism  
Proactive policies include measures such as employing intelligence and surveillance tech-
nologies to detect terrorist activity and capture perpetrators, the obstruction of terrorist fi-
nancial flows and weapons supplies, as well as retaliatory strikes or pre-emptive attacks. 
Beyond physical measures they can also include the tightening of legislation and curbing of 
citizen rights to increase difficulties for terrorists to organise, disseminate their information, 
recruit members, etc. In short, pre-emptive measures, targeting the symptoms of terrorism in 
general aim to starve terrorists of their resources, financial, human as well as technological, 
and disrupt their activities at the source.  
The interception of terrorist financing has surely received most attention within the literature 
analysing the dynamic repercussions of proactive terrorist measures. This is not only due to 
the dependence of terrorist organisations on financial assets to implement their activities but 
also due to the possibility to detect terrorist activity through tracing the money trail in the 
system. Yet, despite the potential elegancy of this approach, it has proven difficult to actu-
ally implement. First, to effectively freeze assets of terrorists, cooperation between states 
and the banking sector is required, which given disincentives to disclose information on 
money transactions has proven difficult to establish (FitzGerald 2004). Second, and for this 
section more relevant, terrorists have shown to circumvent the freezing of their assets 
through diversifying their income sources, but also by blurring the traceability of their trans-
actions (Napoleoni 2003; Alexiev 2004; Schneider 2004). Al-Qaeda, the epitome of an elu-
sive terrorist organisation, receive money from sources ranging from private individuals to 
state sponsors, covered up as “development organisations” and “charities”. Further, they 
employ techniques of blurring the traces of their transactions similar to organised crime 
(Schneider 2004). As a result, stringent measures to severely reduce their assets are said to 
have failed. Enders and Sandler (2006) liken the activities to curb illicit money flows to a 
“leaking bucket”, whose success is at best temporary (Addison and Murshed 2005) as terror-
ists find ways to circumvent regulations.  6 INTERACTION OF ACTORS OF INSECURITY AND SECURITY 
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Apart from the failure to curb financial assets, the economics literature is pessimistic on the 
effectiveness of aggression to decrease human resources of terrorist organisations. The the-
ory recognises three channels through which proactive measures towards terror organisa-
tions could in fact aggravate terrorist behaviour as response: first, aggression, specifically if 
it reduces freedoms of expression and therefore non-political means to express grievances 
will make non-terror activities relatively more costly consequently leading to increased 
terrorist activity (Enders & Sandler, 2006); second, aggression can fuel the legitimacy of 
terror organisations when their struggle for political rights is answered with a tightening of 
rights (Frey, 2004); and thirdly, terror organisations may answer with a reorganisation of 
their structures to evade aggression (Münkler, 2004). Al-Qaeda again provides an essential 
example: the above mentioned elusiveness of this terror organisation results from their suc-
cess in decentralising operations, which decreases the actual area of target and increases the 
independence of its functioning even if key leaders are caught (ibid).50 Enders & Sandler 
(2006) provide the case study of the bombing of Libya in 198651 to show how aggression 
against terrorism is answered with further aggression. Their findings show that this retalia-
tory raid caused an immediate increase to over 38 terrorist attacks per quarter, which subse-
quently fell yet, remained at 12.7 incidents above the pre-intervention mean rather than 
reducing terrorist attacks (Enders & Sandler, 2006). Thus, coercive action towards terror 
organisations appears to result in a zero sum game, which can potentially set of a spiral of 
violence, or as the literature concludes “deterrence may backfire” (Frey (2002)). 
As alternative to aggression, Frey (2004) suggests a few “carrots” to induce terrorists to 
refrain from terrorist activities. Mindful of legal reprisal that terrorists are likely to face 
when giving up their illegal actions, he suggests providing avenues for terrorists to leave 
terrorism. Thus, rather than raising the costs of terrorist activities, he calls to lower the price 
when refraining from the latter. This could be achieved by e.g. providing amnesty or re-
socialisation. Positive measures rather than inducing a zero or negative sum-game will at 
least in theory create a win-win situation where not only targets but also terrorists gain. 
However, sound empirical proof to test this relationship is so far not available and Frey 
(2006) himself recognises that his tactics may induce adverse incentives to terrorists, result-
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do in order to decrease their target area. 
51 The US attacked targets in Libya as response to Libya’s responsibility for the West Berlin night club bombing 
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ing in the exploitation of positive measures and may be considered immoral, particularly by 
victims of terrorist attacks.52  
b)  Targeting root causes of terrorism  
The last policy approach that remains to be discussed focuses on targeting the actual root 
causes of terrorism. While the above sections summarised the impacts of policies that target 
the “permissive factors” (Drakos and Gofas 2006), this section will summarise the literature 
on the effectiveness of eradicating the actual grievances on which terrorist actions are built 
to undermine terrorist legitimacy.  
The main arguments for targeting root causes of terrorism are derived from literature, which 
detects a positive relation between economic and democratic development and low terrorist 
incidences or in reverse, a relation between economic and political deprivation and the rise 
of terrorism. However, no consensus exists on the actual relation between economic (under-) 
development53 and terrorist activity. Some empirical research finds a negative relation be-
tween the level of economic development and terrorism such as Burgoon (2006) who reveals 
that several measures of welfare will reduce the incidence of transnational terrorism, with 
the conclusion that strengthening social policies at home and abroad could serve to combat 
terrorist violence; or Blomberg and Hess (2005) who find that high income (in combination 
with democratic institutions and economic openness) can significantly reduce terrorism 
activity. On the other hand, micro-economic studies show that terrorism is in fact not related 
to economic deprivation: Krueger and Maleckova (2003) examining the root causes of ter-
rorism in the West Bank and Gaza strip, discover that support for violent attacks is not asso-
ciated with lower educational and economic status. In fact, based on data of the characteris-
tics of terrorists themselves they show that higher income (and higher education) does not 
lead to lower support for terrorism. In a similar vain, Beall (2006) argues that no obvious 
link can be found between poverty and terrorism: al-Qaeda recruits are not necessarily from 
poor households.  
At least two possible explanations exist for these divergent findings: first, as Blomberg and 
Hess (2005) argue it is necessary to distinguish between target and source country of terror-
ism, a differentiation which is rarely advanced in the empirical research. While economic 
development may reduce terrorism in a host country, a higher level of economic develop-
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ment attracts terrorism in a target country. A second possible explanation entails the need to 
draw a distinction between different actors of terrorism as will be explained in more detail 
below. Overall, the policy conclusion that economic development will solve terrorism needs 
to be treated with caution. Not only as it simply may not solve the grievances but also since 
different means to arrive at the end “economic development” may even incur new griev-
ances for other factions (Enders & Sandler, 2006). From a different perspective, Enders & 
Sandler (2006) liken the eradication of root causes to a concession to terrorist demands. As 
game theory shows, setting a precedence of conceding to demands is likely to trigger new 
terrorist acts, as they are proven to be successful bargaining tools (Enders & Sandler, 2006; 
Bolechow, 2005).  
Apart from economic grievances, the role of democracy and its relation to terrorism is 
widely discussed in the literature. Just as economic development democracy plays an am-
biguous role in terrorism. Drakos & Gofas (2006) differentiate between the “strategic 
school”, that argues that terrorism by decreasing the price and risk associated with terror will 
induce terrorism, and the “political access” school, which claims that democracies will de-
crease terrorist activity as it provides access to alternative means to express political opin-
ions. Empirical evidence exists for both: Enders and Sandler (2006) based on statistical 
evidence calculate a 3.5 higher likelihood for terrorism occurring in liberal democracies than 
elsewhere; in contrast, Li and Schaub (2004) show that democracy may reduce terrorism. 
Again, there are at least two possible explanations to account for these variations in out-
comes: on the one hand, Drakos & Gofas (2006) argue that the positive relationship between 
democracies and terrorism may simply derive from more accurate reporting of terrorist inci-
dences in democracies. In fact, Drakos & Gofas (2006) show that states which lack democ-
ratic freedoms such as free speech and press suffer from what they term “underreporting 
bias”, the tendency not to report terrorist events. The second explanation relates to the dif-
ferentiation between source and target country of terrorism. Blomberg & Hess (2005) find 
that democratic institutions will significantly reduce terrorism in a source country, though 
increase it in the target country.  
In summary, while actions to drain terrorists of their resources seem to lead to changes in 
structure and organisation of terror organisations, no conclusion can be drawn regarding the 
positive or negative impacts of policies targeting the actual grievances of terrorism. 
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6.1.4  The determinants of the dynamics between security and insecurity  
By way of a simplified summary, defensive policies seem to incur substitution effects, 
changing the mode, target and timing of actual terrorist attacks, while proactive policies, 
whether benevolent or aggressive, whether tackling the symptoms or causes of terrorism 
appear to change the structure and organisation of terror organisations. Overall, the theory 
and available data suggest that in fact, terrorism even if it has not become more frequent, has 
already and will increasingly a) become more severe, b) shift location towards places with 
relatively less security measures in place, such as the Middle East and Asia where it also 
encounters more ready support and c) has adapted its strategies and organisational structures 
to evade proactive policies. Even though no statistical prove may be available for the latter, 
al-Qaeda provides an illustrative example how a terrorist organisation can render a high 
security environment impotent. Thus, human drivers of insecurity such as terrorists create a 
situation of dynamic insecurity which reproduces uncertainty about the nature of the next 
event.  
The literature predominantly suggests that the relative price of terrorist activities versus non 
terrorist activities constitutes the key determinant for terrorist responses to terrorist meas-
ures. Yet, as the above section has shown, there are several other determinants which al-
though having received less attention appear to be critical:  
First, the end of a policy, particularly the differentiation whether to protect targets, counter 
symptoms or actual root causes appears to be a factor in defining terrorist reactions to secu-
rity measures. However, it is questionable whether in fact the actual determinant is the ob-
jective of the policy or rather the means employed to achieve these ends.  
Irrespective of the actual goal (e.g. democracy in Iraq), the tools employed to reach this goal 
have proven to trigger potentially strong (negative) reactions. Essentially, the literature iden-
tifies negative repercussions from aggressive policies, and the possibility of a spiral of vio-
lence. Benevolence, in contrast, implies at least in theory a positive sum game or a win-win 
solution for both terrorists and targets (Anderton and Carter 2005). However, no empirical 
evidence exists that demonstrates this positive relation. Yet, at the most basic level, there is 
widespread agreement that terrorism requires economic and political not military solutions.  
Ultimately, the responses to security measures are determined by the actual preferences of 
the terror agents themselves. The summary above has shown that the simple model of terror-
ism behaviour may be correct in its essence (terrorists as rational agents), yet, it is too sim-
plistic and requires extension to fully account for all possible reactions:  6 INTERACTION OF ACTORS OF INSECURITY AND SECURITY 
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First and foremost, Anderton & Carter (2005) highlight that the reactions as modelled by 
e.g. Frey (2006) or Enders & Sandler (2004) assume a specific set of preferences, but espe-
cially assume substitutability of terror with non-terror acts. Anderton & Carter’s (2005) 
model which incorporates Slutzky’s differentiation between income and substitution effects 
between different goods, highlights that only if terror and non-terrorist means to achieve 
political objectives are substitutes, a decrease in the relative costs of non-terror means will 
induce a shift towards the latter. As long as the actual cross price elasticity, (or in plain 
words, the preferences of terrorists to change their activities in response to changes in 
prices) are not known, the impact of price changes cannot be predicted with certainty. In a 
similar vain, Addison and Murshed (2005) contend that the motivation of terrorists is key to 
understand reactions to response measures. In a simplified model, Addison & Murshed dif-
ferentiate degrees of militancy suggesting that more militant terrorist members will be less 
easily deterred from violent means than less militant terrorists.54  
Applying this framework to different players of terror organisations, it is possible to differ-
entiate between three agents who are likely to differ in degrees of militancy and thus motiva-
tion:  
Terrorist leaders are likely to fall into the category of the more militant terrorist actors as 
understood by Addison & Murshed (2005). Consequently, unless their respective grievances 
are addressed they will seek to circumvent security measures most ardently in favour of 
terrorist means. Their elasticity to substitute terrorism with non terrorist action is likely to be 
small if not zero or even negative.  
Terrorist recruits could have less militant motivations, i.e. they may be driven by other 
(e.g. economic) factors than merely political goals. Therefore, a price change in the possible 
alternatives may be more successful in changing their terrorist inclinations. Thus it is possi-
ble to hypothesise that their elasticity to substitute terrorism for non terrorist action is likely 
to be greater than zero. Within the group of terrorist recruits, Frey (2004) makes the impor-
tant distinction between terrorists already part and potential future terrorists. While disincen-
tives to choose terrorist activities have to be created for the latter, specific incentives for the 
first have to be created in order to enable them to renounce their violent behaviour (ibid).  
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Terrorist support groups are agents not directly involved in the actual planning and execu-
tion of terrorist acts but those who provide material, mental and financial support to terrorist 
organisations. As they often constitute the constituencies terrorists are fighting for, their 
support and in reverse targeting to reduce their support can be of significant importance. It is 
difficult to estimate their preferences but since they are not directly engaged in terrorist 
activities themselves, their political objectives could weigh less than other considerations be 
they economic or any other. Therefore it could be inferred that their demand for non terrorist 
action is more price elastic.  
Furthermore, it is necessary to consider individual terrorist groupings that may not be di-
rectly part of a terror organisation but organise and implement attacks in line with a specific 
terrorist organisation as has been witnessed with al-Qaeda splinter groups. While the litera-
ture recognises this phenomenon of the loose network structure of al-Qaeda (for example 
Reuter, 2004) in general at least no economic literature was found that analyses this phe-
nomenon more explicitly.  
Last but not least, the outcomes of the analysis of response reactions are determined by the 
indicators used to measure terrorist actions. Most knowledge on terrorist trends and patterns 
is based on data measuring the frequency and severity of terrorist attacks, as the only indica-
tor of change. However, it is impossible to conclude with certainty that a change in number 
and severity of attacks provides the best indicator for a change in terror activity. In contrary, 
a prolonged period of time without a terror event does not necessarily mean the ceasing of 
terror activity; a large scale strike could be in preparation. In other words, impressions of the 
nature of change are limited to the available indicators, yet these may not be the most repre-
sentative for the real degree and nature of terror activity. 
6.2  Limitations in the existing literature 
Given the dynamic nature of terrorism outlined above, the conclusion “we know that we 
don’t know” appears suitable, especially as comparatively little empirical information exists 
to substantiate the theoretical analysis of the dynamics of insecurity. In this light, the effort 
of Enders & Sandler (2006) is even more commendable in advancing the state of the art on 
the dynamics of terror and providing an important set of “stylised facts” on the interactions 
between actors of security and insecurity.  
The fundamental problem persisting in this field of security economics is the lack of datasets 
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motivations to intensify or refrain from terrorist activities reflected in above mentioned cross 
price elasticities cannot be quantified, and thus ultimate effects not derived. Knowledge, and 
especially data gaps become apparent in three major areas: a) data on the motivations and 
behaviour of individuals, be they leaders, followers or supporters; b) data on the under-
ground activities and dynamics of terror organisations and c) information of the relative 
significance of other factors that influence terror organisations. 
6.2.1  Preferences and motivations of individual terrorists 
Little data and thus information are available on the respective motivations and preferences 
of different groups of terrorists. As has been pointed out above, preferences to substitute 
activities differ across individuals potentially determined by their degree of “militancy”. 
Economists have been “guilty of neglecting these preferences of terrorists” in their analysis 
(Addison & Murshed, 2005) thus producing knowledge based on too simplistic assumptions 
which may provide stylised facts of terrorist behaviour, yet, are of limited usefulness to 
actually analyse the impacts of policy measures. 
6.2.2 Organisations’  behaviour 
At a more aggregate level, there is little information to identify patterns of emergence, evo-
lution and cessation of terror organisations. Even though terrorism is treated in much of the 
analysis as a monolithic entity, no information exists whether the assumption of common 
patterns of terrorism is applicable, or whether in fact, the dynamics of terror activities vary 
between different terror organisations and should thus be treated case by case. Again, the 
major problem lies in the lack of data that allows the statistical characterisation of terrorist 
organisations. 
6.2.3 Interactions 
Last but not least, solid knowledge on the relative significance of the different factors which 
influence terror dynamics is lacking. Terror responds to a variety of factors exogenous to 
actual security measures, including actors and actions on the “official” visible political scene 
(host and target states, support communities, etc) as well as actors of the invisible criminal 
scene (other terror organisations, organised crime, etc).55 Terror organisations are therefore 
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embedded in a web of interrelations which jointly determine their resource endowments and 
an analysis of the cost impacts of security measures has to take these inter-relations into 
consideration again not just to provide stylised facts of terror but more meaningful conclu-
sions on the impact of security measures. 
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7  KEY FINDINGS OF THE LITERATURE SURVEY  
The analysis of the existing literature provides insights first regarding the direct and indirect 
impacts of terrorism on the economy and second, on current gaps in the knowledge which 
require further research in the future.  
With respect to the first, the survey derives the following nine key findings.  
1.  The impacts of terrorist attacks vary with the nature and target of the attack but also with 
the maturity of an economy. While mature well diversified economies seem to be able to 
absorb the shock of an attack, terrorist attacks can have significant negative impacts on 
small less diversified economies.  
2.  It is not only terrorist attacks but the threat of terrorism which incurs impacts on the 
economy in the form of security measures that economic agents at all levels take.  
3.  Although empirical evidence is scant the literature suggests that these security measures 
can have significant economic repercussions at both macro- and micro-economic level.  
4.  Appropriate policy decisions are critical to contain the negative impacts of actual terror-
ist attacks and the fear of future attacks which terrorism instils.  
5.  Given political and economic inter-dependencies, economic repercussions of both terror-
ism and security measures can stretch beyond national economies.  
6.  Thus, globalisation has on the one hand enhanced the resilience of economies to large 
scale shocks while on the other has increased the vulnerability of economies and eco-
nomic agents to be implicated in the repercussions of initially local events such as a ter-
rorist attack.  
7.  Terrorists adapt their activities and strategies to changed levels of security with reper-
cussions on the future nature of attacks and their consequent economic impacts. The lit-
erature argues that terrorism in response to security measures has become more severe; 
shifted to relatively more permissive locations (such as the Middle East and Asia); and 
has decentralised its organisational structures to evade proactive policies as illustrated for 
example by the elusive network structure of al-Qaeda. 
8.  Given this dynamism of human-induced insecurity more attention should be paid to 
“systemic resilience” to buffer against unknown future risks.  7 KEY FINDINGS OF THE LITERATURE SURVEY 
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9.  Since terrorism is only one element within a larger “portfolio of risks” it should not be 
treated in isolation but linkages with other forms of (human induced) insecurity should be 
identified and synergies between counter measures where possible exploited. 
Second, the above survey has generated key findings regarding future research needs to fill 
critical knowledge gaps which currently create obstacles to informed policy and decision 
making. These research gaps can be summarised into the following six points: 
1.  The available empirical literature focuses largely on the macro-economic outcomes 
rather than understanding the underlying processes that lead to these impacts. Particularly 
little is known about the structure and behaviour of terror organisations, with the conse-
quence that only limited conclusions can be drawn about the impacts and effectiveness of 
security measures to reduce terrorism. 
2.  The security economics literature focuses on the negative impacts caused by perpetrators 
but rather neglects impacts resulting from responses to terrorism. As the literature survey 
shows, economic impacts of terrorist events are transient in large economies but can be 
extended due to security reactions of targeted agents. Yet, no detailed research is avail-
able that studies the actual responses of economic agents to terrorism. Related to this, no 
aggregate analysis exists, that studies the macro-economic consequences of security 
measures on economies.  
3.  Further, the literature is heavily biased to impacts of terrorism in industrialised countries, 
even though it is shown that a) most terrorism is occurring in relatively less developed 
countries, b) economic development in less developed economies can be negatively af-
fected by both terrorism and security measures and c) there may be a relation between 
economic grievances and terrorist activities in terror host countries. Thus understanding 
the dynamics of terror in small economies may prove critical for the understanding of in-
security in the EU.  
4.  Terrorism and counter-terrorist measures are often analysed in isolation in the literature, 
although this form of insecurity represents only one element in a larger “portfolio of 
risks” which includes other factors of insecurity such as organised crime and conflicts. 
Further, there are several indications of substantial conceptual and practical overlaps be-
tween diverse threats to security which should be analysed within an integrated frame-
work of the “human drivers of insecurity”.  7 KEY FINDINGS OF THE LITERATURE SURVEY 
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5.  Much knowledge is based on theoretical reasoning with only limited and highly frag-
mented empirical evidence to substantiate the theory. The major cause of this gap is the 
restricted availability of data not only of terrorist behaviour but also of the behaviour of 
targets and their governments. 
6.  Last but not least, up to today only little of the academic research has been turned into 
readily available policy knowledge. 8 RESEARCH NEEDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
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8  RESEARCH NEEDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As the analysis of the available literature and its limitations shows, relatively more knowl-
edge on the economic repercussions of terrorism exists at aggregate macro-economic level, 
at the expense to understand underlying processes at micro-economic level. Yet, in order to 
manage impacts, it is critical to comprehend the underlying drivers. Given the intricate rela-
tion between terrorism and response reactions of targets more information is required to 
grasp the dynamic behaviour of both terrorists as well as targets, to understand how they 
relate to and interact with each other. Thus, research in the following two fields of enquiry is 
necessary: 
8.1  The structure and behaviour of terror organisations 
Knowledge on the actual dynamic behaviour of terrorists is limited and further research in 
three inter-related areas is needed:  
1. The motivations and preferences of individual terrorist actors, differentiating between 
leaders, recruits and supporters. At the most basic, it is mandatory to know who terrorists 
are, why they engage in terrorism and what factors determine their choices between ter-
rorist and non-terrorist actions. In addition, the dynamics and interrelations between these 
actors need to be understood, especially how terror organisations find legitimacy within 
their support constituencies and how leaders and recruits interact and relate to each other. 
An issue which has not been studied, yet, which is highly relevant particularly in relation 
to the legitimation of terrorist groupings, is the economic role terror organisations play in 
their host countries at macro- as well as micro-economic level. As mentioned above, 
Hamas for example plays a significant role in health provision in Gaza and the West 
Bank (Hilsenrath 2005) thus bestowing a substantial social and economic benefit poten-
tially in return for support and legitimacy. Thus, apart from the impacts of terror attacks, 
the economic repercussions of terror activities needs to be better understood.  
2. The dynamics of terror organisations as whole, patterns of their emergence, evolution and 
cessation; particularly the last has not been studied from an economics perspective.  
3. As terrorist organisations do not work in isolation more information is necessary on their 
relations and dynamics with official political actors (host and target states as well as their 8 RESEARCH NEEDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
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supporting constituencies) and more difficult, their interactions with other actors of vio-
lence and crime, e.g. other terrorist groups and organised crime. 
Overall, knowledge of specific terrorist organisations and actions needs to be strengthened 
in order to identify whether aggregation across terrorist behaviour is legitimate, or to what 
extent terror organisations, their causes, dynamics and thus the remedies against them have 
to be approached on a case by case basis. The most important task within this research field 
is the collection of data that is able to characterise terrorists and terror organisations in more 
detail. Lack of available data will also be the main constraint to advance this area of re-
search. Yet, at the same time it should be recognised that much research on specific terror 
organisations has been done in other academic disciplines. A first step towards a more dif-
ferentiated economic analysis could be to incorporate this data and information where possi-
ble, if not for statistical analysis so at least to attempt to revise too simplistic models and 
conceptualisations of terrorist organisations and behaviour. 
8.2  The structure and behaviour of targets of terrorism  
The analysis of the economic repercussions of terrorism is biased towards identifying costs 
incurred by perpetrators at the expense to understand how sub-optimal response reactions 
extent these economic impacts beyond the actual attack. Although the theory and some em-
pirical studies show that response reactions of economic agents to terrorism will have sig-
nificant economic repercussions there is little knowledge what these response reactions and 
their impacts in practice are. A pressing research need is therefore to identify how economic 
agents react to terrorism (across Europe) what the determinants of these response reactions 
are and how negative economic impacts of these response reactions could be contained.  
Particular emphasis should be placed on the “fear factor” which has been mentioned above. 
As Enders and Sandler (2004) point out, it is difficult to estimate the total effects of terror-
ism without understanding the dynamics of “fear”. Given that much consumer and producer 
behaviour is determined by their respective perception of risk and security a more rigorous 
analysis is required that assesses not only how fear impacts on behaviour but especially what 
determines the perception of risk and security. This analysis should shed light to what extent 
public security measures and the media re-enforce perceptions of risk, rather than an actual 
terrorist event itself. 8 RESEARCH NEEDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
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8.3  The economic impacts of terrorism 
Even though macro-economic impacts of terrorist action are relatively better understood 
than micro-economic processes, this knowledge is still insufficient especially with regards to 
its geographic coverage. Overall, available research has focussed on impact analyses in a 
few selected case studies of industrialised countries at the expense to understand economic 
impacts of terrorism in low and middle income countries. Thus, Enders & Sandler (2006) 
point to the need for a more encompassing cross-country analysis of the economic impacts 
of terrorism. Particular focus needs to be placed on impacts on small, less developed 
economies, not least as many of these provide potential breeding ground for future terrorists, 
and a relation between terrorism and economic grievances may exist. This cross country 
analysis should shed light on how impacts on a comprehensive set of indicators vary with 
the nature of the terrorist event but especially how they vary across different sized econo-
mies.  
To be able to contextualise the magnitude of terrorism and thus, the significance, its impacts 
should be compared to conceptually similar events. Tavares (2004) provides a first attempt 
comparing terrorism to natural disasters and financial crisis. This effort should be extended 
to a more comprehensive analysis.  
Further, given the inter-dependence of the current economic system, spill over effects of 
terrorism between neighbouring countries require more attention, asking how terrorism in 
one country will impact on economic activity, growth and development in neighbouring 
countries. Spill over effects could be of particular interest in the context of the EU, identify-
ing to what extent events in one country will impact on other member states and how EU 
integration can buffer against an escalation of an attack. 
8.4  The economic impacts of security measures  
In contrast to the economic impacts of terrorism, the economic impacts of security measures 
at macro-economic level are hardly understood. Building on the information gained through 
the analysis of response reactions at micro-economic level, the economic repercussions of 
security reactions, positive and negative, should be quantified. This analysis should account 
for the overhead expenditures on security technologies, but also for the wider repercussions 
on efficiency and effectiveness of economic processes and thus economic growth.  8 RESEARCH NEEDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
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Regarding potential positive impacts certainly more information has to be generated to as-
sess the economic opportunities arising from the security industry. Just as the “green tech-
nologies” sector, the security industry is emerging as a niche market – yet, so far not suffi-
cient knowledge is available on the EU’s comparative advantage, competitiveness and thus 
its overall economic opportunities. At a more general level, the economic analysis of the 
impacts of terror and security measures should incorporate a more thorough distributional 
analysis of “winners” and “losers” of terrorism not only within but also across economies.  
Regarding the negative impacts, a more rigorous approach to quantify the relative costs 
arising from different security measures is required. Importantly, this has to consider not 
only the costs arising within the country implementing these measures but also negative 
externalities for countries maintaining economic relations with countries implementing secu-
rity measures. For similar reasons as mentioned above, specifically the economic impacts of 
security measures on developing countries should be evaluated.  
 At a more overarching level, more research is necessary to answer the pertinent question, 
how to secure an economy against “unidentified” shocks. This relates to the idea that the 
ultimate objective should focus to enhance systemic resilience rather than aim to protect 
single targets against specific threats. Overall, a more rigorous understanding on the relation 
between internal security and economic development is needed. Specifically, information is 
required whether there are real trade-offs between economic competitiveness and growth or 
whether a synthesis between the two could be created leading to “secure growth”. In this 
respect, it is necessary to identify to what extent security against terrorism could enhance 
security against other threats and insecurity, thus, creating positive externalities. 
8.5  Conceptual ground work  
Beyond the empirical ground work that needs to be done, further advances at a conceptual 
level are necessary. At various points in the report, it has been argued that terrorism and 
respective counter measures have been largely studied in isolation. Yet, terrorism is only one 
element in a suite of different security threats, which have to be analysed in integrated fash-
ion. This includes comparing the structure and behaviour of terror organisations within a 
larger context of (organised) crime; identify how economic impacts compare to other forms 
of human induced security and whether synergies between different security measures could 
be created. 8 RESEARCH NEEDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
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8.6  Data collection and methodologies  
Last but not least, the availability and reliability of data has been recognised as a key con-
straint to the study of the economics of terrorism. The dataset ITERATE for example, which 
many studies rely on is based on the news coverage of terrorism attacks. Thus, a) it cannot 
account for signs of terrorism not related to a specific event and b) it excludes events which 
the media does not consider worth reporting on or is restricted to report on due to limited 
political freedoms (Tavares and Llussa, 2006). On the other hand, official records or records 
compiled by terrorist groups themselves are likely to be censored or truncated to serve po-
litical objectives, an effect which has been studied by for example Drakos (various) as the 
“underreporting bias”, as has been mentioned above. Thus, improved data collection and 
management is of critical importance. In the case of the EU, some data is available, yet no 
comprehensive database on terror incidences seems to exist or is accessible for European 
researchers with the result that they have to rely on datasets generated by the US. The efforts 
made in the US should not be replicated, but rather complemented by identifying new and 
improved indicators to measure the level of terrorist activity and security besides the simple 
mean of counting terror acts. In other words, innovative indicators to measure security, inse-
curity and their mutual repercussions on the economy should be part and parcel of further 
EU research. In this context, a necessary precondition is an EU-wide agreed definition of 
terrorism and terrorist acts, which ensures that comparable data is collected across all EU 
member states.  
Apart from improved data collection improved methodologies are required to measures 
especially non-monetary economic impacts of terrorism. Frey & Lüchinger (2004, 2005) and 
Frey, Lüchinger & Stutzer (2006) have surely advanced the state of the art by employing 
contingent valuation techniques to account for the non-economic impacts of terrorism. Yet, 
these techniques are not without their limitations and further approaches should be explored 
to capture previously unaccounted economic and non-economic costs and benefits of both 
terrorism and terror counter measures. 
8.7  Policy relevant knowledge 
Specific to the EU policy making, a comparative analysis of national, European and global 
economic security policies could be useful. Pertinent questions which should be addressed 
include a) different aspects and categories of security policies as pertaining to different lev-
els of policy making and their respective institutions (national – regional (e.g. EU) – global 8 RESEARCH NEEDS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
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(e.g. UN, WTO) b) the identification of (qualitative) criteria against which different types of 
security policies will be analysed and compared c) an assessment to what extent different 
types of policies can complement or contradict each other – thus identifying sets of policies 
creating synergies and analysing how different policies may counteract each other at differ-
ent levels (e.g. national versus EU versus global level) d) an analysis, which actor is best 
placed to provide respective types of policies, here not only differentiating between levels of 
policy making but also between public and private providers of security. Given the dynamic 
interaction between security and insecurity, this analysis should also incorporate an evalua-
tion of potential long term dynamics regarding future terrorist behaviour.  
Given the inter-dependence of security, a particular point which warrants attention is to what 
extent agreement persists between EU member states on the importance and methods to 
counter terrorism, or in reverse to what extent the effectiveness of security policies could be 
undermined by member states unwilling to cooperate. This analysis should include an as-
sessment of the relative repercussions of common security policies that each member state 
faces. 9 EUROPEAN RESEARCH CAPACITY IN THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY 
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9  EUROPEAN RESEARCH CAPACITY IN THE ECONOMICS 
OF SECURITY 
Terrorism and its counter measures are a cross-boundary phenomenon. Causes and conse-
quences of terrorism and security measures are not confined to a politically or economically 
defined territory. At the same time, terrorism is experienced differently across the various 
EU member states: while to some the problem is virtually unknown, others have or are ex-
periencing domestically motivated forms of terrorism, while again others face the threat of 
the new global terrorism. Similarly, the political, social and economic consequences of ter-
ror counter-measures will impact differently in each member states. Thus, understanding 
terrorism and the opportunities and repercussions of anti-terror measures requires taking a 
pan-European if not global approach that takes these different perspectives into considera-
tion.  
This in combination with the identified knowledge gaps leads to the question whether 
Europe currently holds the necessary research capacity to address this suite of research chal-
lenges which have been outlined above. Research capacity, i.e. the capacity to produce in-
novative knowledge and information, is dependent on three groups who influence the quality 
and quantity of research: first, the individual researcher who generates knowledge, second, 
the research community comprising the sum of individual researchers, who exchange infor-
mation, pool knowledge, review outputs and thus cooperate to generate high quality infor-
mation efficiently and effectively; and third, the end users of research who require knowl-
edge for learning and informed decision making. Thus, beyond the capabilities of research-
ers themselves, research capacity is determined on the one hand by the research infrastruc-
ture which allows researchers to cooperate and collaborate with each other; and on the other 
by the institutional set-up. This set-up supports the generation of applied knowledge accord-
ing to end user needs without dictating the research agenda, leaving researchers to pursue 
the necessary groundwork on which applied research can be built.  
Consequently, assessing EU research capacity needs to take three inter-related elements into 
consideration: 
1. The availability of high quality researchers at present as well as in the future. 9 EUROPEAN RESEARCH CAPACITY IN THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY 
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2. The quality of the research infrastructure, i.e. institutions and facilities that allow for 
networking, collaboration and quality control between researchers across the European 
Union. 
3. The institutional set-up (or the relations between researchers and end-users) mainly re-
flected in allocation of funding and facilities which ensures that knowledge creation is 
guided by end-user needs without restraining the space for researchers to shape and de-
velop their field of research. 
9.1  Excellence of researchers 
The US is often taken as point of comparison or benchmark to evaluate the research com-
petitiveness of the European Union. The key difference between US and European security 
economists lies in their focus of research: US economists have engaged in research on trans-
national fundamentalist terrorism in general and al-Qaeda in particular even before 9/11 
(Shapiro 2004).56 In contrast, European economists studying terrorism have in the past fo-
cussed on the repercussions of nationalist and extreme left- and right-wing terrorism in a 
few selected countries (e.g. Greece, Spain) and have only recently turned their attention 
towards trans-national fundamentalist terrorism Consequently, until today there is no re-
search analysing the economic repercussions of trans-national terrorism and security meas-
ures for European countries individually and the EU as a whole. Table 9-4 provides a list of 
the most important economists who have engaged in the economic analysis of security and 
terrorism.  
Most European economists pursue the study of terrorism as a sub-topic within their respec-
tive areas of research. They address terrorism and its repercussions within their respective 
fields of interest but are not as such specialised in the economics of security or terrorism. 
Hence, these economists rarely communicate with each other across their sub-disciplinary 
boundaries, preventing economies of scale in security economics to be realised. Further-
more, many of these researchers are likely to “return” to their standard non-security research 
agenda after publishing one or two articles on the economics of security from their individ-
ual sub-disciplinary perspectives. Those academics concentrating on the subject of terrorism 
are not economists but belong to various other disciplines such as sociology, politics, inter-
national relations, criminology and law. In contrast, there are a few US economists who 
                                                                          
56 This is not surprising considering that the US has been the target of al-Qaeda and fundamentalist terrorism 
already before the attacks on the World Trade Centre, although mostly outside its state territory. 9 EUROPEAN RESEARCH CAPACITY IN THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY 
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especially in recent years have dedicated their full attention to the economic analysis of 
terrorism, such as W. Enders, T. Sandler, or S. B. Blomberg, whose individual lists of refe-
reed publications on terrorism and other activities far exceed the activities of any EU secu-
rity economist.  
Nevertheless, even if economists in Europe show less commitment to the topic of terrorism, 
the quality of research equals the quality generated in the US, judging by the quality of their 
respective publications. Both US and European economists publish mostly in the same jour-
nals such as Defence and Peace Economics, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, the Euro-
pean Journal of Political Economy, etc.  
Further, even if not a single European economist alone may cover the same ground as one of 
these US specialists, Europe could reach a similar depth and breadth cumulatively. Yet, the 
geographic dispersion of security economists currently poses a major obstacle to take full 
advantage of the available research potential in Europe. This distance and the resulting lack 
of cooperation between security economists has until now resulted in an unbalanced ap-
proach to tackle the various issues and research questions of the field as the analysis has 
shown. European security economists have focused predominantly on the analysis of under-
lying causes and motivations of terrorism and the direct economic repercussions of terrorism 
attacks in a few selected case studies. The analysis of the behaviour of target populations 
and the economic repercussions of security measures across economic agents has so far 
attracted little attention. Further, apart from the political analysis of Europe’s role in the 
international arena to tackle terrorism, research on economic issues at the EU level has not 
been advanced. Overall, while some areas have been studied in great depth and detail, other 
areas, specifically concerning EU decision making, have been largely neglected.  
Regarding future expertise, there are a few high quality institutions in the EU with dedicated 
undergraduate and master programmes in security and conflict studies. Yet again, these 
courses focus mainly on the political or sociological elements of security and terrorism, not 
placing much attention to the underlying economic issues. Nevertheless, there are several 
individual researchers who have dedicated their Master or PhD theses to economic aspects 
of terrorism. However, there is no organised training at the bachelor, master or doctoral level 
on the economics of security anywhere in the European Union (to our knowledge). This new 
discipline remains highly specialised and isolated attracting only relatively few individuals.  
In conclusion, there is a growing number of isolated research economists spread across 
Europe and many sub-disciplines who jointly could address the remaining knowledge gaps 9 EUROPEAN RESEARCH CAPACITY IN THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY 
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and advance the state of the art. Establishing a European security economics discipline 
would require a communication and cooperation mechanism that ensures that previously 
disconnected economists can pool their expertise, avoid duplication of research efforts and 
address gaps in current knowledge efficient and effectively. Overall, there is not yet an es-
tablished European research community dedicated to the study of security economics. 
9.2  Research infrastructure  
The geographic and sub-disciplinary dispersion of researchers and the scale of the task, 
particularly addressing trans-boundary and European level issues of insecurity and security , 
require strong cooperation between individual researchers. There are a large number of re-
search centres and universities in the European Union who focus on security as a main 
theme or who devote departments or projects to security-related research bringing together 
researchers from across the European Union and various disciplines. Most of these institu-
tions are specialised in the study of conflict or security provision at a more general level, 
while only one institute focuses on terrorism exclusively. Nevertheless, several institutions 
have in the past or present allocated funds and time to the study of terrorism, either as stand-
alone projects or within a larger programme of terrorism research (see Table 9-1). Again, 
this terrorism research focuses mainly on the origins and causes of terrorism and activities 
and adequate policy responses, with issues of international relations and foreign policy re-
ceiving most attention. Thus, most researchers who are cooperating through these institu-
tions are experts in of politics, sociology or public policy.  
In contrast, the economic analysis of security or terrorism hardly features on the research 
agenda of these institutes. Congruently, economists are mostly absent from staff lists of 
these institutes and their projects. Economists might cooperate on a small scale working and 
publishing in teams of two to three experts mostly from the same institutions. However, an 
overarching network for an academic exchange of ideas or cooperation mechanism for col-
laborative research does not exist in the economics of security. Consequently, the current 
experts in security economics are working in isolation not only from other ongoing pro-
grammes and activities but also from each other.  
One of the reasons for this lack of a focussed research community on the economics of secu-
rity relates to the lack of security- or terrorism- related data collection or data infrastructure. 
This inhibits new research on security economics as outlined above. However, it also pre-
vents divergent researchers from crystallising around such infrastructures as users and de-9 EUROPEAN RESEARCH CAPACITY IN THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY 
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velopers. Typically, such data collection projects must be based at a research institute or a 
university to provide continuity. Also they require long-term funding to enable the build up 
of long and comparable data series. Once such data are collected, researchers can gather 
around this project and start cluster, build critical mass and establish networks. 
There are first attempts at European Level to enhance the collaboration of security econo-
mists, specifically through the 7th Framework Programme. This funding mechanism not 
only places security economics explicitly on the research agenda but also makes the cross-
country collaboration of economists compulsory for the successful application of projects. 
Yet, without the actual institutionalisation of a coordinating mechanism this collaboration is 
unlikely to last beyond project duration. In other words, unlike in the United States which 
has several institutes focusing on security economics (see Table 9-3), there is currently not a 
single centre or institute in Europe dedicated to the study of security economics. 
Thus, security economics faces the same problem as research in general as identified by the 
European Commission in 2002 (COM(2002)565): research activities across the European 
Union are fragmented suffering under the lack of coordination which could avoid duplica-
tion of efforts and address knowledge gaps more efficiently and effectively. In order to take 
full advantage of the research capacity of individual security economists two critical steps 
are necessary: first, to enhance the collaboration between security economists across the 
European Union and second, to link security economists to existing research centres to en-
sure that economics can draw from and complements other disciplines of security research. 
9.3  Institutional set-up  
Last but not least, European research capacity is dependent on the relations between re-
search community and end-users who determine the salience of the research subject and will 
influence research capacity through the allocation of funds. In this respect, it is necessary to 
consider the importance that is placed on security economics by the EU as well as its indi-
vidual member states.  
At EU level, the European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB) has explicitly rec-
ognised that “economic theory in particular can offer key insights, enabling governments to 
optimise their efforts to enhance security and growth” (ESRAB 2006: 59). Building on this 
insight, Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) recognizes not only the role of security as 
research programme but dedicates funds explicitly to the area of “security economics”. The 
European Forum for Security Research and Innovation (ESRIF) that will replace the ES-9 EUROPEAN RESEARCH CAPACITY IN THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY 
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RAB may build on these first steps and further promote security economics with a view to 
support informed policy making.  
Yet, this first step to promote security economics as a discipline and to increase its visibility 
in policy circles is undermined by the limited attention paid to the subject at the national 
level. National security research programmes provide a good insight of the limited impor-
tance attributed to security economics across EU member states. At the time of writing, only 
nine out of 27 EU members have introduced an explicit security research strategy to guide 
and coordinate their research activities in this field.57 These strategies focus on technological 
aspects and solutions to enhance security and counter the threat of terrorism. Apart from 
Austria, who has made the integration of humanities and social sciences into all security 
research mandatory, and Germany where humanities and social science issues may be inte-
grated into technologically oriented projects, national security research strategies do not 
recognise the importance of social sciences in general and economics in specific for the 
advance of security research. Even where the importance of social acceptability of security 
policies is explicitly mentioned no separate funds are allocated independently to foster the 
enquiry of social sciences in general or economics in specific into security. This limited 
interest of EU member states in security economics creates another obstacle to the advance 
of security economics as a newly emerging research discipline in Europe. In the US most 
security research appears to be privately funded, and consequently, an aggregate figure on 
dedicated funds is not available. Given that until today private funding in the EU has not 
been channelled into this research area, the role of governments is even more important.  
9.4  Assessment and recommendations 
In summary, even though Europe holds a significant research potential in security econom-
ics in the form of a small number of highly skilled economists who are interested in this 
field, the current research framework and institutional set up create obstacles to take full 
advantage of this potential. The urgency is reflected in the fact that a number of security 
economists from Europe and its neighbours prefer to work in the US rather than in Europe.58 
Consequently, even if security economics has been assigned importance under the 7
th 
Framework Programme, this will remain temporary and unsustainable if not additional ac-
                                                                          
57 These nine countries include Austria, The Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, the Nether-
lands, Poland and the UK. 
58 Security economists which have migrated to work in the US include internationally acclaimed academics such 
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tions are undertaken to improve the current research infrastructure and to anchor and institu-
tionalise security economics in European and national research strategies. Three actions 
should be taken  
First, at the European level a network of experts in the economics of security and terrorism 
should be established. An important point of departure could be to build on the available 
research capacity embodied in those economists who have up to today devoted time and 
effort into the subject. Building on the 7
th Framework Programme a European network of 
security economists should be institutionalised to foster coordination and cooperation be-
tween economists across the European Union. This could also enhance the recognition of 
security economics at the national level, foster the relation between researchers and end-
users, and promote security economics as discipline to a new generation of researchers and 
academics.  
Strengthening cooperation between security economists in Europe will enhance the research 
potential that is currently scattered across Europe. Such a network of security economists 
should analyse the causes, organisation and consequences of European and global terrorism 
from an economic point of view; and improve the design and the evaluation of anti-terror 
policies using analytical and empirical economic techniques. Beyond research and policy 
advice it should foster and enhance training and capacity building across Europe. Impor-
tantly, the network should grow over time and reach out to other relevant disciplines which 
endeavour to understand the causes and consequences of security and insecurity. Given that 
the problem of terrorism is not confined to Europe, cooperation could be extended to incor-
porate economists and researchers beyond Europe. 
Second, we recommend for the European Union or its member states to consider establish-
ing a research centre or institute dedicated to the economics of security and terrorism. Such 
a European Centre would compete directly with similar US centres for research. On the one 
hand such centre could provide the research infrastructure needed to advance the data situa-
tion to enable downstream applied research on security economics. On the other hand, it 
could provide a unique European perspective on terrorism and security policy, which is 
likely to differ significantly from the perspectives and approaches practiced in the United 
States.  
Third we recommend for national European governments to include security economics in 
their security research programmes and in their general research funding bodies as a distinct 
and independent research area. Important conceptual and empirical insights can be expected 9 EUROPEAN RESEARCH CAPACITY IN THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY 
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from such research which will yield advances in basic research and in policy making. Thus, 
security economics as a discipline should be funded due to its own inherent benefits as out-
lined in this study, and not as a top-up component in technology-driven, industrially oriented 
research programmes. Given the public good nature of research findings in security econom-
ics, the private sector cannot be expected to provide funding for such research. As with all 
other research excellence in terms of expected research outcomes should be the guiding 
principle in allocating research funding in this discipline. 
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Table 9-1 
Research centres in the European Union working on security economics 
 
Institute  Department   Programme / Project  Focus  Discipline  Sector   Activities  
AUSTRIA 
University of Vienna  Institute for 
Risk research 
  Inter- disciplinary risk research focusing mainly on 
technological / industrial risks (e.g. nuclear, GM, etc)  
inter-disciplinary  University research / teaching 
Austrian Institute for 
International Relations
    "Comprehensive Security" and international relations; 
specific project regarding infrastructure protection  
inter-
disciplinary/politics 
Private  Research / Policy  
BELGIUM 
Centre for European 





European Liberty and 
Security: Security 
Issues, Social Cohesion 
and Institutional Devel-
opment of the European 
Union (ELISE) 
European Security policy, selected projects focus on 
European Liberty and Security, Transparency and Effec-
tiveness of EU Foreign Security Policy 




 International  Terrorism 
Project 
address longer-term issues, to building sustainable 
international defences against terrorism (stable states and 
regions, addressing underlying grievances) focus on 
interests and responsibilities of major powers, how they 
interact with those of the states and regions in question. 
Politics private    research 
DENMARK 




1. Terrorism 2.Defence 
and Security 
1. radicalisation in Europe 2. explain and understand the 
ways in which armed force and terrorism is used with the 
aim of enhancing our ability to prevent, manage and end 
the use of armed force and terrorism => interest in 
economics but no economists! 
Politics / IR  University research / training 9 EUROPEAN RESEARCH CAPACITY IN THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY 
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Institute  Department   Programme / Project  Focus  Discipline  Sector   Activities  
FRANCE 




Challenge - Liberty & 
Security 
The CHALLENGE project responds to widespread 
concerns about the resort to specific illiberal practices by 
contemporary liberal regimes. These practices are linked 
with the identification of increasing insecurities globally, 
insecurities that are widely interpreted as obliging sterner 
policies from the authorities and, consequently, new 
constraints on principles of liberty under law and pre-
sumptions about the innocence of individuals. Specifi-
cally, the project examines tensions created by claims 
that ‘security is the first freedom’ and that a new ‘bal-
ance’ has to be established to manage the global scale of 
contemporary dangers. 
Politics / IR  university  Research / training 
GERMANY 
Institute for Peace 
Research and Security 
Policy at the Univer-





  Opportunities for enhancing the European Union's 
responsibilities in the area of peace and security policy. 
In particular, ZEUS analyses the EU's global role in 
peace and security issues with respect to relevant areas of 
policy and the Union's formal and practical relations with 
NATO and the UN, the USA and Russia, and key regions 
for European security, 
Politics / IR  University research / teaching 
Bonn International 
Centre for Conversion 
    Arms, peace building and conflict and cross-cutting 






(AFB) Peace Research 
Information Unit 
Bonn (PRIUB)  
    Workshops & discussions to promote mediation between 
academic peace research and political administration and 
civil society; producing AFB-INFO, a peace research 
newsletter; information service through website 
 private  policy  /  networking 









The role of violent conflicts, wars and fragility at the 
micro-level as a key factor for underdevelopment and 
poverty. Policy recommendations for economic recovery 
in the post-war period. European security economics and 
policy analysis 
Economics   Public  Research / policy 
advice / networking 9 EUROPEAN RESEARCH CAPACITY IN THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY 
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    Research on the development of national / trans-national 
terrorism and extremism and its consequences on society, 
economy and politics.  




  Migration and Home-
land Security Pro-
gramme 
Issues that concern the development of the European area 
of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) and Poland’s role 
within it amongst other things: European Security and 
terrorism – the Polish perspective 
politics private  research 
SPAIN 
Centro de 
Investigacion para la 
paz 
  Transnational Terrorism analyses of causes and characteristics of global terrorism 
and consequences on personal freedom and human rights. 






    Euro-Atlantic, Regional and Global Security, Arms, etc.. 
security at various levels (national, global) functional 
issues, e.g. business and security 










CSSD's geographic focus is on states and regions under-
going radical political and social change. The Centre's 
strategic heartland is the nexus of democracy and democ-
ratic practice, good governance and the rule of law; 
security and justice. It is action and solution based, 
looking for sustainable outcomes.  
politics/IR  University research / teaching 







Global Terrorism and 
Transnational Organ-
ised Crime  
political, diplomatic, economic and legal aspects of 
combating global terrorism and organised crime. Areas of 
interest include: Sources of terrorism, organisation & 
methods; Areas of transnational organised criminal 
activity; Co-operation or co-ordination of legislation, law 
enforcement and intelligence within the EU; Co-
operation in the wider Europe and globally  
Interdisciplinary  private  research / policy 9 EUROPEAN RESEARCH CAPACITY IN THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY 
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Institute  Department   Programme / Project  Focus  Discipline  Sector   Activities  




tion, the role of the 
EU 
 Global  and  Regional 
Security Governance: 
Security Threats and 
Institutional Response 
policy issues in global governance: problems in the 
governance of trade, finance, security, environment, 
technology, development, social production and gender 
inequality, disease;  
the role of the EU in the advancement of research and 
policy in themes (i)-(iii) 




lence of researchers 
Chatham House    Europe / International 
Security 
The International Security Programme produces policy-
orientated research into and analysis of issues important 
to the new security agenda. Europe 
Serves as a forum for research and debate on questions of 
politics, economics and security in Europe. 
politics / IR  private  research / policy 
University of Bradford Department of 
Peace Studies 
International and 
Regional Conflict and 
Security 
Research area Political Violence and Terrorism 
Challenges of political violence and terrorism; prevent-
ing, reducing and combating terrorism; interrelationships 
between terrorism, poverty and alienation; strategies and 
tactics of groups using political violence and terrorism; 
terror and conflict relating to specific contexts (including 
Chechnya, Pakistan & South Asia; Middle East, Iraq, 
Horn of Africa); examination of ‘war on terror’ and its 
implications. 
Inter-disciplinary 
focus on politics, IR, 
sociology 
university  research / teaching 
International Institute 
for Strategic Studies 
  Terrorism and Counter-
Terrorism 
Threats and threat perceptions, state and non-state actors 
involved in conducting or supporting terrorism, and, 
ultimately, how members of the international community 
can align strategies and foster effective cooperation to 
help counter terrorism (also cost aspects!) 
Politics / IR / public 
policy 
private  research / policy 
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Table 9-2 
Selected research centres in EU associate countries working on security economics59  
Institute Department  Programme  /  Project  Focus  Sector   Other activities 
NORWAY 
FAFO    New Security Programme   social conditions of conflict, interac-
tion between the economy and conflict 
/ the Economies of Conflict  
private   research / policy 
/ network 
International Peace Research, 
Institute, Oslo (PRIO) 
 Security  Programme  interdisciplinary research projects 
focusing on the ways in which individ-
ual states, the European Union and the 
United Nations respond to various 
security challenges, while at the same 
time exploring new approaches that do 
not emphasize the state as primary 
referent of security 
private   research / policy 
/ network 
Norwegian Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs (NUPI) 
International Policies  Terrorism and international 
crime 
Failed states and growth of terrorism 
and international crime; Terrorism and 
crime towards shipping and oil activ-
ity; Terrorist networks; relationships 
between corruption and organised 
crime; relationships between political 
terrorism and profit-oriented crime; 
terror, security policy and response; 
conditions in the Middle East that 
create and sustain terrorism; right-wing 
extremism; nuclear terrorism and the 
non proliferation of fissile materials. 
mainly politics 
public research   
                                                                          
59 Countries associated with the EU include those having applied for EU candidacy, EEA countries (Norway) and countries with an association agreement (Israel, Switzer-
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Institute Department  Programme  /  Project  Focus  Sector   Other activities 
SWITZERLAND 
Centre for Research in Eco-
nomics, Management and Arts 
(CREMA) 
    promotes scientific research in eco-
nomics, management and the arts, 
based on the rational choice approach 
and on insights from the neighbouring 
social sciences (in particular psychol-
ogy, sociology and law). 
Private   Research  / 
teaching  
Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology Zurich 
Centre of Security Studies    Research in the fields of international 
and Swiss security policy from a 
political and historic perspective 
university  research / teach-
ing 
Geneva Centre for Security 
Policy 
    Challenges to Peace and Security, 
including WMD proliferation, terror-
ism, threats to human security and 
migration; Global and Regional Issues 
Conflict; Management and Peace 
building; Geopolitical Implications of 
Globalisation 
public  research / policy 
/ training / 
networking  
ISRAEL  
Institute for counter-terrorism     Provide  expertise in terrorism, counter-
terrorism, homeland security, threat 
vulnerability and risk assessment, 
intelligence analysis and national 
security and defence policy 
public  research / policy 
/ networking / 
data 




Selected major research centres in the US working on security economics 
Institute  Department   Programme / Project Focus Sector    activities 
UNITED STATES           
World Policy Institute    Counterterrorism 
Project 
Explores history, attitudes and aspirations of 
both the leaders of these nations and their 
citizens and presents a number of alternate 
models designed to ensure the future security 
and balanced economic development of the 
region. 
university research   
Brookings Institute  Defence / Economics  Homeland Security   Border  security;  Cost  distribution  of  Home-
land security; Emergency incident response; 
Government organization; Internal defence; 
Preventive efforts; Other 
private research 
Wharton University of 
Pennsylvania 
Risk management and decision 
processes centre 
Terrorism Insurance  Multidisciplinary approach to terrorism insur-
ance / financing 
university  research / training 
National Bureau of 
Economic Research 
(NBER) 
  Economics of Na-
tional Security  
wide range of issues that affect national secu-





Centre of Risk and Economic 
Analysis of Terrorism 
  developing computer models to analyze the 
risks, consequences, emergency response, and 
economics of terrorism 
public research   
Economists for Peace 
and Security 
    US Military and Security Policy; International 
Peace building; Teaching the Economics of 
War and Peace and new projects given certain 
criteria 




Centre for Peace and Security 
Studies 
  Non-Military Aspects of Security; Conflict 
and Conflict Resolution; Technology & Secu-
rity; Arms and Arms Control; The United 
States and International Security 
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Institute  Department   Programme / Project Focus Sector    activities 
Terrorism and Homeland Secu-
rity  
  Terrorism research and analysis (since 1970s)  RAND Corporation 
RAND Centre for Terrorism Risk 
and Management Policy  
  Terrorism insurance, Terrorism liability, 
Compensation, Security, Terrorism Risk 
Management  
private  research / policy / 
teaching  
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Table 9-4 
List of key EU security economists 
 
Surname First  name  Institution  Country   Terror related focus 
Addison  Tony  UNU/WIDER   Finland  Causes and consequences of conflict 
Azam Jean  Paul  University of Toulouse  France  Economics of Conflict and Redistribution 
including Civil War, Violence against Civil-
ians, Looting and Terror, Terrorism, Sanc-
tions, Conflict 
Prevention, State Formation; 
Barros  Carlos P.   Instituto Superior de Economia 
e Gestão Technical University 
of Lisbon,  
Portugal  Defence economics: terrorism (Islamic and 
ETA terrorist groups); Efficiency of defence 
industries. 
Brück  Tilman  German Institute for Economic 
Research (DIW Berlin) 
Germany  Terrorism, conflict, war, reconstruction 
Brzoska Michael BICC    Germany  arms  trade, arms production, peace and de-
fence economics and development policy. 
Dihel  Nora  OECD  Europe  Trade, security related impacts on trade 
Drakos Konstantinos  University  of  Patras  Greece  Economics of Terrorism / Terrorism Model-
ling 
Esteban  Joan  Universidad Autonoma, Barce-
lona 
Spain  regional economics, polarization pov-
erty/inequality, conflict 
FitzGerald  Valpy  Oxford University  UK  Terrorist financing 9 EUROPEAN RESEARCH CAPACITY IN THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY 
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Frey  Bruno S.  University of Zurich Switzerland  Impacts  of  terrorism and counter-measures 
Gardeazabal  Javier  Universidad del Pais Viasco  Spain  economic impacts of conflict and terrorism  
Hartley  Keith  University of York  UK  Defence Economics 
Hoeffler  Anke  Oxford University  UK  Conflict, Failed States 
La Ferrara  Eliana  IGIER  Italy  Development Economics, Economic impacts 
of conflict 
Lenain  Patrick  OECD  Europe  Economic consequences of terror  
Lüchinger  Simon  University of Zurich  Switzerland  Consequences of terror and counter-terror 
measures 
Michel-Kerjan Erwann  Laboratoire  d'Économétrie, 
École Polytechnique, Paris  
France   Financial management and large scale risks 
including terrorism  
Mirza Daniel  University  of  Rennes  France  Trade, impacts of counter-measures on trade 
Murshed  S. Mansoob  Institute of Social Studies  Netherlands  Economics of Conflict and Peace 
Nitsch  Volker  Free University, Berlin  Germany  Trade and Terrorism amongst others 
Schneider  Friedrich  Johannes Kepler University, 
Linz 
Austria  Shadow economies, terror financing  9 EUROPEAN RESEARCH CAPACITY IN THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY 
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Suder   Gabriele  CERAM Sophia Antipolis 
European School of Business 
France   Impact of European Economic Integration, 
risk management within regional integration 
Tavares  Jose  Faculdade de Economia  
Universidade Nova de Lisboa 
Portugal Economics  of  Terrorism 
Wolfelsperger Alain  Professeur,  Institut  d’Etudes 
Politiques de Paris 
France  Political economy of terrorism  10 Bibliography 
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